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Articles 
REFORMING SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 
Derek W. Black 
ABSTRACT—Public schools suspend millions of students each year, but 
less than ten percent of suspensions are for serious misbehavior. School 
leaders argue that these suspensions ensure an orderly educational 
environment for those students who remain. Social science demonstrates 
the opposite. The practice of regularly suspending students negatively 
affects misbehaving students as well as innocent bystanders. All things 
being equal, schools that manage student behavior through means other 
than suspension produce the highest achieving students. In this respect, the 
quality of education a school provides is closely connected to its discipline 
policies. 
Reformers have largely overlooked the connection between discipline 
and educational quality. This oversight has limited theoretical and practical 
tools for change. On the theoretical side, reformers miss the opportunity to 
pit harsh discipline as the enemy of good schools. Instead, they fall victim 
to the narrative of bad students as the enemy of good ones. On the practical 
side, they miss the opportunity to demand legal reform. Instead, they 
relegate themselves to asking schools to voluntarily adopt less severe 
discipline policies. Thus far, voluntary efforts have produced some 
significant changes, but the changes are isolated and limited in scope. In 
short, reformers need new legal theories and tools to demand reform. 
Otherwise, harsh discipline will remain the dominant paradigm for the 
foreseeable future and efforts to improve educational quality and 
achievement—the most pressing item on the national agenda of the day—
will continue to fall short. 
While some scholars have proposed limits on the most egregious 
discipline policies, this Article is the first to offer a legal theory that would 
substantively reform school discipline on the whole and improve 
educational quality. The theory is grounded in the affirmative education 
rights and duties found in state constitutions. These rights and duties give 
rise to two distinct but interrelated arguments. First, because students have 
a constitutionally protected individual right to education, suspensions and 
expulsions should trigger heightened scrutiny. Heightened scrutiny would 
not bar suspensions, but it would force states to justify the efficacy of 
suspension. The practical result would be to prompt states to adopt 
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pedagogically sound approaches to student misbehavior. Second, discipline 
practices that undermine educational quality violate states’ constitutional 
obligation to provide equal and adequate educational opportunities to all 
students. In these instances, state constitutions should obligate states to 
intervene with reform. Unlike past strategies, these two steps can ensure 
discipline reform and educational quality improvements that normally 
prove elusive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By short-term suspension or semester- and year-long expulsion, public 
schools exclude about three and a half million students a year.1 Since the 
1970s, many students’ chances of exclusion have doubled and tripled.2 
Each African-American student who passes through the halls of a middle or 
high school in the fall has nearly a one-in-four chance of being suspended 
or expelled by the spring.3 Some schools today will actually hand out more 
total suspensions than they have students, suspending some students 
multiple times.4 This dramatic spike results from schools increasingly 
suspending and expelling students for relatively minor misbehavior. Today, 
less than ten percent of suspensions and expulsions are for weapons, 
violence, or drug-related behavior.5 The rest are for misbehavior that in the 
past would have been dealt with informally. This represents a shift in 
discipline philosophy itself—from discipline responses designed to 
improve students’ behavior to punitive responses that “demonstrate 
toughness and reassure the public that [school officials] are in control.”6 
 
1 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, DATA 
SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 2 (2014), http://ocrdata.ed.gov/Downloads/CRDC-School-Discipline-
Snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH78-N72B]. 
2 DANIEL LOSEN ET AL., CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES, ARE WE CLOSING THE SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE GAP? 6 (2015), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-
remedies/school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/are-we-closing-the-school-discipline-
gap/AreWeClosingTheSchoolDisciplineGap_FINAL221.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2PH-2F24].  
3 Id. 
4 EVERY STUDENT EVERY DAY COAL., DISTRICT DISCIPLINE: THE OVERUSE OF SCHOOL 
SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 4 (2013), 
http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/DC_District-Discipline-Overuse-of-School-Suspension-and-
Expulsion-in-DC_DCLY_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZVV-S5D7]. 
5 See, e.g., CONN. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS IN CONNECTICUT 33 
(2015), http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/pdf/deps/sctg/suspensions_and_expulsions_2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6LX8-2J8B]; see also DANIEL J. LOSEN & TIA ELENA MARTINEZ, CTR. FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS REMEDIES, OUT OF SCHOOL & OFF TRACK: THE OVERUSE OF SUSPENSIONS IN AMERICAN 
MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOLS 1, 20 (2013), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-
for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/out-of-school-and-off-track-the-
overuse-of-suspensions-in-american-middle-and-high-schools/OutofSchool-OffTrack_UCLA_4-8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5U5C-U7GN] (reviewing national discipline data and finding that “most out-of-school 
suspensions are for minor offenses”). In some instances, drugs and weapons account for less than five 
percent of suspensions and expulsions. M. Karega Rausch & Russell Skiba, Unplanned Outcomes: 
Suspensions and Expulsions in Indiana, EDUC. POL’Y BRIEFS (Ctr. for Evaluation & Educ. Policy, 
Bloomington, Ind.), Summer 2004, at 2, http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED488917.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q4FA-BRUG]; Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., Rethinking School Discipline, 
Remarks at the Release of the Joint DOJ-ED School Discipline Guidance Package (Jan. 8, 2014), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/rethinking-school-discipline [https://perma.cc/7TZD-QPK7] 
(indicating as much as 95% of school exclusions are for nonviolent behavior). 
6 Pedro A. Noguera, Preventing and Producing Violence: A Critical Analysis of Responses to 
School Violence, 65 HARV. EDUC. REV. 189, 190 (1995). 
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This entails “rigid[ly] and inflexibl[y] . . . meting out punishment upon 
students who violate school rules,” regardless of the infraction.7 
The effects of this shift are far-reaching for both individual students 
and the overall education system. Data increasingly shows that the frequent 
use of suspension and expulsion to control student behavior creates a 
negative learning environment that incentivizes misbehavior and depresses 
overall academic achievement.8 For the struggling student, punitive 
disciplinary environments may produce more misbehavior, not less.9 When 
schools suspend or expel these students, the next step for a significant 
number will eventually be the juvenile justice system.10 Moreover, the 
result is not to create a better learning environment for well-behaved 
students. To the contrary, punitive discipline undermines educational 
outcomes for well-behaved students as well.11 
For the past decade, advocates, researchers, and a few policymakers 
have worked feverishly to end punitive discipline and slow the so-called 
school-to-prison pipeline.12 The strategy has involved two steps. The first 
step has been to emphasize the staggering raw data on school suspensions 
and law enforcement referrals, hoping to shame schools into reform.13 The 
second step emphasizes the availability of discipline models that help 
 
7 Id. 
8 See, e.g., M. KAREGA RAUSCH & RUSSELL J. SKIBA, THE ACADEMIC COST OF DISCIPLINE: THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUSPENSION/EXPULSION AND SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT 19–20 (2005) 
(conducting two different regression analyses that showed that the use of “suspension and expulsion is 
negatively related to achievement, even when socio-demographic variables are held constant”); see also 
infra notes 248–75. 
9 See infra notes 261–65, 280–84. 
10 See generally Susan Ferriss, Virginia Tops Nation in Sending Students to Cops, Courts: Where 
Does Your State Rank?, THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (last updated Feb. 19, 2016) 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/04/10/17089/virginia-tops-nation-sending-students-cops-courts-
where-does-your-state-rank [https://perma.cc/LE97-4TB3] (reporting that nearly 16 in every 1000 
Virginia students were referred to law enforcement).  
11 See, e.g., Brea L. Perry & Edward W. Morris, Suspending Progress: Collateral Consequences of 
Exclusionary Punishment in Public Schools, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 1067, 1068 (2014); RAUSCH & SKIBA, 
supra note 8, at 19. 
12 See, e.g., JUDITH A. BROWNE, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, DERAILED!: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO 
JAILHOUSE TRACK 30 (2003) (calling on schools to reduce harsh discipline policies and referrals to law 
enforcement); LOSEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 34 (calling on schools to close the discipline gap); 
Motoko Rich, Obama to Report Widening of Initiative for Black and Latino Boys: My Brother’s Keeper 
Program Grows to Include More Impoverished Minorities, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/21/education/obamas-my-brothers-keeper-education-program-expa 
nds.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/C6C2-S5MR] (describing presidential initiative to improve life 
outcomes for African-American and Latino boys, including by improving discipline policies). 
13 For instance, after a national study identified Oklahoma City public schools as among the very 
worst in the nation in terms of suspension rates, the district immediately responded with an audit of its 
discipline data and a promise to implement reform. Ben Felder, OKC School Suspension Rates Are 
Among Highest in the Nation, OKLA. GAZETTE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://okgazette.com/2015/03/04/okc-
school-suspension-rates-are-among-highest-in-the-nation/ [https://perma.cc/U6E4-XJWD]. 
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students make better decisions and avoid misbehavior in the first instance, 
trusting that conscientious schools will adopt best practices.14 While these 
efforts have achieved promising results in several locations,15 positive 
results remain isolated and harsh discipline remains dominant.16 
The inability of reformers to identify a legal basis to demand 
meaningful change in court has slowed progress. While existing precedent 
clearly protects students’ right to certain procedures prior to punishment,17 
it has done very little to force schools to rethink the basic justifications for 
suspending and expelling students.18 Currently, reformers’ primary option 
is to pursue administrative remedies with the U.S. Department of 
Education. Administrative remedies, however, are limited in scope. In 
2014, the Department announced a new discipline policy, but the 
Department only has authority to limit egregious racial disparities in school 
discipline, not punitive discipline in general.19 Equally problematic, the 
new policy is subject to discretionary underenforcement and retraction at 
any time. 
Recognizing the need for legal remedies, scholars have theorized 
constitutional limits on the most egregious forms of school discipline and 
zero tolerance.20 But no one has articulated a broad legal theory for 
holistically reforming school discipline or connecting discipline policies to 
education quality. This Article offers that theory, challenging school 
exclusions and negative educational environments based on the rights and 
 
14 For a full discussion of the tools states and schools might adopt to improve discipline outcomes, 
see Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for Change, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313 
(2016). 
15 See, e.g., Teresa Watanabe, LAUSD to Decriminalize Student Fights, Petty Thefts and Minor 
Offenses, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014, 7:52 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lausd-
to-decriminalize-student-fights-petty-thefts-minor-offenses-20140819-story.html [https://perma.cc/
J874-TLR6]; Tom Mela, How We Won School Discipline Reform in Massachusetts, NAT’L 
OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN CAMPAIGN (July 23, 2014), http://www.otlcampaign.org/blog/
2014/07/23/how-we-won-school-discipline-reform-massachusetts [https://perma.cc/258G-HEJK]. 
16 See, e.g., Derek Black, California Limits School Suspensions: Did It Do Enough?, EDUC. L. 
PROF. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/2014/10/california-limits-
school-suspensions-did-it-do-enough.html [https://perma.cc/V55D-6RSA]. 
17 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975). 
18 Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L. REV. 823, 
841–66 (2015) (explaining how U.S. Supreme Court precedent fell far short of its intended result of 
reforming school discipline). 
19 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter on Nondiscriminatory 
Administration of School Discipline 11–12 (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHA7-RWUU]. 
20 See, e.g., Black, supra note 18, at 828; Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, One Strike and You’re 
Out? Constitutional Constraints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 65, 108 
(2003); Aaron Sussman, Learning in Lockdown: School Police, Race, and the Limits of Law, 59 UCLA 
L. REV. 788, 831–35 (2012); Robyn K. Bitner, Note, Exiled from Education: Plyler v. Doe’s Impact on 
the Constitutionality of Long-Term Suspensions and Expulsions, 101 VA. L. REV. 763, 767 (2015). 
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duties that grow out of education clauses found in state constitutions.21 
These rights and duties give rise to two distinct, but interrelated claims. 
One claim is based on an excluded student’s individual right to education. 
The other is based on states’ general duty to provide equal and adequate 
educational opportunities.22 
The first claim posits that suspensions and expulsions should trigger 
heightened scrutiny. Over the past forty years, the right to education has 
changed substantially. Initially, courts treated education as a statutory right, 
subject to no more than rational basis review under federal law. Now, 
education has achieved a constitutional status under state law, with courts 
recognizing education as a constitutional right of students or a 
constitutional duty of states and requiring school funding and quality 
reforms in more than half of the states.23 This precedent supports the 
proposition that students have an individual constitutional right to 
education under state constitutions that schools cannot simply take away 
without meeting some form of heightened scrutiny.24 Heightened scrutiny 
would require an important or compelling reason for taking that right away, 
along with a showing that suspension and expulsion are substantially 
related or narrowly tailored to achieving those goals.25 With serious 
misbehaviors, schools could easily meet this standard in most 
circumstances, leaving current practices in place.26 But schools’ unfettered 
 
21 See generally Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the 
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1500–05 (2007) (discussing the results in state 
cases and the substantive meaning of the constitutional right to education in those cases); William E. 
Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance 
Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1666 (1989) (providing an overview of the various education 
clauses in state constitutions). 
22 Some states recognize a right to an equal and an adequate education, while others recognize a 
right to only one or the other. For the purposes of this Article, those distinctions are unimportant and, 
thus, this Article uses the phrase adequate and equal education for ease and readability. For more on the 
unimportance of this distinction, see Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 477 (2014). 
23 Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step 
Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1397 (2010). 
24 See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255–56 (N.C. 1997); Sch. Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. 
Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 
1994); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 391–95 (Vt. 1997). This Article uses the phrase “heightened 
scrutiny” to refer to strict and intermediate scrutiny collectively. While strict scrutiny is the general 
default for violations of fundamental and other constitutional rights, courts do not uniformly apply it in 
all instances. 
25 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976); Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340, 346–47 (W. Va. 1997) (quoting Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 918 (W. Va. 1996) (McHugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
26 See generally King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259 (N.C. 
2010) (discussing how strict school discipline policy would pass rational basis, intermediate, and strict 
scrutiny review). 
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authority to remove students for misbehavior as minor as class disruption 
would be severely restricted. 
The individualized rights claim, however, might only serve to bring 
suspension rates down. It would not necessarily ensure substantive 
educational and disciplinary reform that improves educational outcomes for 
everyone; a school could just stop suspending students and do nothing to 
improve the disciplinary environment. This could partially salvage the 
education of some students, but undermine the education of others. To 
ensure broader reforms, disciplinary theories must also incorporate states’ 
systematic constitutional duties in education—the basis for the second 
claim type. 
The second claim posits that discipline policies and practices that 
significantly undermine the quality of education a school offers violate the 
state’s constitutional education duty. State constitutions obligate states to 
provide equal and adequate educational opportunities to all students.27 
Empirical evidence indicates that schools cannot consistently deliver equal 
and adequate education opportunities without also ensuring effective 
discipline policy.28 Dysfunctional disciplinary environments deprive all 
students, including well-behaved students, of access to equal and adequate 
educational opportunities. When this occurs, state education clauses 
obligate states to intervene with reforms that improve discipline and, 
thereby, the quality of education. 
This second claim has greater potential to transform the debate over 
school discipline. Too often the current debate pits “good” students against 
“bad” ones.29 The interests of good students will almost always win this 
battle, which means schools will continue to single out “bad” students and 
set them on the schoolhouse-to-jailhouse path. This framing, however, 
incorrectly assumes that misbehaving students’ interests are adverse to 
everyone else’s interests. This Article reframes the debate by focusing on 
the close connection between educational quality and discipline policy. By 
emphasizing how punitive discipline undermines educational quality in 
 
27 Rebell, supra note 21, at 1515. 
28 See infra notes 249–76, 320–49. 
29 See, e.g., Ben Wolfgang, Obama Administration Guidelines Could Lead to Racial Quotas in 
School Discipline, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/8/
white-house-to-offer-new-rules-school-discipline/ [https://perma.cc/Y7PX-KA6S] (addressing the 
concern that new suspension guidelines will cause administrators to overlook bad behavior by 
minorities); Teresa Watanabe & Howard Blume, Why Some LAUSD Teachers Are Balking at a New 
Approach to Discipline Problems, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/
education/la-me-school-discipline-20151108-story.html [https://perma.cc/9RKF-KGA6] (indicating that 
some teachers believe the new approach to discipline is preventing them from disciplining students who 
need it). 
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general, this Article targets punitive discipline as the enemy of quality 
educational opportunities and, thus, the interests of all students. With that 
framing, non-punitive approaches to discipline that emphasize positive 
reinforcement for appropriate behavior and early individualized 
interventions for students showing signs of misbehavior become a strategy 
to improve overall educational outcomes. 
This Article develops this argument in three parts. Part I outlines the 
historical development of the state constitutional right to education and 
states’ duty to deliver it, including the theoretical and doctrinal principles 
developed in past litigation. Of particular importance is courts’ recognition 
that academic outcomes depend on two factors: students’ individual 
capabilities and disadvantages, and schools’ responses to them. The state 
may not be able to control the former, but it is entirely responsible for the 
latter. Thus, when students systemically fail to succeed in school, courts 
have rejected states’ attempts to blame students—or even local school 
personnel—and reasoned that the state has a responsibility to offer students 
the support necessary to succeed.30 
Part II examines the few cases that have attempted to use school 
finance precedent in the context of school discipline and identifies the 
flaws in that litigation. Overall, these cases are a story of bad facts making 
bad law. Rather than challenging suspensions for minor misbehavior, 
plaintiffs in these cases have sought access to alternative schools for 
students who engaged in serious misbehavior.31 In this context, courts have 
either avoided or misunderstood the central questions of whether education 
is a constitutional right and what justifications suffice for taking it away. 
Part II ends with answers to those questions and outlines the appropriate 
framework for bringing and adjudicating claims on behalf of suspended 
and expelled students. In particular, it argues that the most compelling case 
on behalf of students has yet to be made: states lack a sufficient 
justification to exclude students from regular school for extended periods 
of time when all they have done is engage in minor misbehavior. 
Part III shifts from individual rights analysis to the state’s duty to 
deliver adequate and equal education opportunities for all students. First, it 
establishes the factual predicate that discipline policy affects educational 
 
30 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 
599 S.E.2d 365, 390–91 (N.C. 2004) (indicating state had failed to identify and support at-risk 
students); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 179 (S.C. 2014) (emphasizing the need to 
address the current reality in which the state “creat[es] school districts filled with students of the most 
disadvantaged socioeconomic background, exposing students in those school districts to substandard 
educational inputs, and then maintaining that nothing can be done to improve those school districts’ 
unacceptable performances”). 
31 See, e.g., King, 704 S.E.2d at 260; In re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 115–17 (Miss. 1996). 
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opportunity. It does so through social science studies finding a statistical 
correlation between discipline policy, educational quality, and student 
achievement. Those studies establish that: (1) negative school climates 
incentivize more misbehavior;32 (2) the discipline decisions school officials 
make shape school climate; and (3) school climate affects student 
achievement and largely explains the achievement gap between students at 
predominantly low-income school and middle-income schools.33 Part III 
situates these findings within school quality and finance precedent, arguing 
that states have an affirmative obligation to reform discipline policy and 
improve disciplinary environments. Part III ends by briefly comparing the 
individual rights approach to discipline to the duty-based approach. It 
concludes that a duty-based claim is the strongest of the two, but that the 
claims should be jointly pursued. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
A. Historical Evolution 
In 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education,34 the U.S. Supreme Court 
wrote that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments . . . [and] it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education.”35 Yet, the Court refrained from recognizing education as a 
fundamental right.36 When that issue was squarely before the Court nearly 
two decades later in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez,37 the Court held that education is not a fundamental right, and 
poverty-based discrimination in education is only subject to rational basis 
review.38 With this defeat, advocates abandoned federal courts as a venue 
for school finance litigation claims arguing that inequities in education 
resources and quality violated students’ constitutional rights. Instead, 
advocates brought future claims exclusively in state courts.39 
 
32 See infra notes 262–66. 
33 See, e.g., Richard Arum & Melissa Velez, Class and Racial Differences in U.S. School 
Disciplinary Environments, in IMPROVING LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND 
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 298–302 (Richard Arum & Melissa Velez 
eds., 2012). 
34 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
35 Id. at 493. 
36 Id. (indicating equality applies only “where the state has undertaken to provide [education]”). 
37 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
38 Id. at 28–29, 35. 
39 Black, supra note 23, at 1360–61. 
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The state claims were theoretically and factually the same as those in 
Rodriguez, but differed in one key aspect: the state claims were based on 
education clauses in state constitutions.40 In contrast to the federal 
Constitution’s silence on education, state constitutions affirmatively 
obligate states to do certain things, the most important of which is to 
deliver education.41 In fact, all fifty state constitutions specifically mandate 
that the state establish and maintain public schools.42 
Litigation based on these education clauses succeeded immediately. In 
1973, just weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that funding inequities violated 
students’ state constitutional right to a “thorough and efficient” education.43 
Three years later, the Supreme Court of California held that the California 
Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to education and that funding 
inequities violated that right.44 Over the next decade, courts in several other 
states followed with similar holdings.45 
In the 1980s, school finance litigation began to focus more heavily on 
quality and less on formal equity.46 Some began to question the potential 
limits of equity theory and noted that many state constitutions contained 
rich language that spoke to the quality of education.47 During this same 
period, “standards-based reform” was occurring in education policy, which 
 
40 See generally Thro, supra note 21, at 1657–70 (describing state education clauses and their role 
in litigation).  
41 Id. at 1667–68 (“By their texts, the Category IV clauses impose the greatest obligation on the 
state legislature. Typically, they provide that education is ‘fundamental,’ ‘primary,’ or ‘paramount.’”).  
42 The official number of state constitutions imposing an education duty or right has varied between 
forty-nine and fifty over the past half-century based on Mississippi’s constitutional vacillations. The 
Mississippi Constitution of 1890 imposed upon the state to establish a uniform system of public 
schools, but that obligation was erased from the constitution in 1960 as a reaction to Brown v. Board of 
Education. Hon. Michael P. Mills & William Quin, II, The Right to a “Minimally Adequate Education” 
as Guaranteed by the Mississippi Constitution, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1521, 1525–26 (1998); see also T.H. 
Freeland, III et al., Seeking Educational Funding Equity in Mississippi: “I Asked for Water, You Gave 
Me Gasoline,” 58 MISS. L.J. 247, 258–59 (1988). In 1987, Mississippi amended its constitution again in 
a way that could be read to reestablish a duty on the state. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201 (“The 
Legislature shall, by general law, provide for the establishment, maintenance and support of free public 
schools upon such conditions and limitations as the Legislature may prescribe.”). 
43 Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294–95 (N.J. 1973), reheard as to remedy, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 
1975). 
44 Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (clarifying and reaffirming its pre-Rodriguez 
holding). 
45 See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983); Horton v. Meskill, 
376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978); 
Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980). 
46 Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the Name of 
Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION 
FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 34, 53–56 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999). 
47 Id. 
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lent support to the notion that states should improve basic quality in 
education.48 Prompted by reports, national summits, and popular media 
charging that students in the United States were not mastering core 
educational concepts and were falling behind their international 
counterparts, states began developing core academic standards that all 
students would be required to meet.49 
Those academic standards and students’ scores on tests of those 
standards soon found their way into plaintiffs’ legal claims. Plaintiffs 
argued that state constitutional phrases such as “efficient,” “thorough,” and 
“sound basic” education obligated states to provide children with a quality 
education that could be measured through the academic standards and tests 
that states had developed.50 For instance, in Rose v. Council for Better 
Education, Inc.,51 the Kentucky Supreme Court became the first to fully 
articulate a qualitative right to education, holding that a constitutionally 
adequate or “efficient” education included several specific skills and 
outcomes in each of the major subjects of school curriculum.52 Numerous 
other state courts borrowed from Rose’s standards or followed Rose’s 
approach in defining their own.53 With these litigation successes and the 
continued emphasis on standards-based learning, quality-based litigation 
quickly became, and has since remained, a dominant theory in 
constitutional education litigation.54 
Equity litigation, however, did not abruptly end. Instead, the lines 
between “equity” and “adequacy” litigation have increasingly blurred in 
recent decades.55 Litigants now often include both theories in their claims.56 
 
48 Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. 
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 555–63 
(1992) (describing the perceived crisis in academic standards in public schools and the effort to reform 
them). 
49 Joetta L. Sack, The End of an Education Presidency, EDUC. WK., Jan. 17, 2001. 
50 Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 46, at 52. 
51 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
52 Id. at 212. 
53 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 165–66 (Ala. 1993); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 
25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 485 (Ark. 2002), mandate recalled by 142 S.W.3d 643 (Ark. 2004); 
Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734 (Idaho 1993); McDuffy v. Sec’y 
of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 
(Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); 
Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999). 
54 See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 17, Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Haslam, (Tenn. Ch. Aug. 31, 2015) (No. 
15-1048III); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157 (S.C. 2014). 
55 William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination of the 
Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 
1187–88, 1283–96 (2003) (explaining that no clear line divides equality theories from adequacy 
theories and that, in fact, both theories are present in most education finance cases); Weishart, supra 
note 22, at 478–81. 
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Moreover, while the terms adequate, equal, and quality education are 
theoretically distinct, scholars have demonstrated that the functional 
differences between these phrases are not that significant.57 The factual 
circumstances that would support a violation of any of these rights are 
generally the same.58 Even where some functional differences might exist, 
they are not pertinent to this Article’s arguments. The main point for this 
Article is simply to highlight the litigation success that followed the advent 
of adequacy theories. Rose marked the beginning of twenty-seven school 
finance cases—most of them premised on adequacy—that would be filed 
between 1989 and 2006.59 Plaintiffs prevailed in nearly 75% of those cases, 
as compared to the less than 50% success rate prior to Rose.60 While school 
finance litigation took a brief respite during the Great Recession, numerous 
cases have been filed in the last few years.61 
B. Doctrinal and Theoretical Principles 
1. The Creation of Rights and Duties.—Several important ideas and 
principles developed in school finance litigation have direct bearing on 
school discipline. The most obvious is that a majority of state courts have 
held that education clauses in state constitutions create rights or duties.62 
Some courts ask whether education is a fundamental right and, if so, apply 
strict scrutiny to state policies and practices that create unequal access to 
educational opportunity.63 Other courts ask whether the state constitution 
obligates the legislature to ensure certain educational opportunities and, if 
so, whether the state has carried out that duty.64 For the purposes of this 
 
56 See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 764 (Kan. 2006) (addressing both equity and adequacy 
concerns). 
57 Weishart, supra note 22, at 482. 
58 Id. 
59 Rebell, supra note 21, at 1527. 
60 Id. 
61 See, e.g., Dwyer v. State, 357 P.3d 185 (Colo. 2015); Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 1132, 1144 
(Colo. 2013); Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 793–94 (R.I. 2014); Morath v. Texas 
Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 850–54 (Tex. 2016). 
62 See Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy 
Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 83, 
89–95 (2010) (surveying outcomes in school finance litigation). 
63 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 948–50 (Cal. 1976), supplemented, 569 P.2d 1303 
(Cal. 1977); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979). 
64 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 1995) 
(determining whether “State’s public school financing system effectively fails to provide for a 
minimally adequate educational opportunity”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 
200 (Ky. 1989) (“The subject matter of this lawsuit is whether the General Assembly has complied with 
its constitutional duty to provide an ‘efficient’ system of common schools in Kentucky.”). North 
Carolina, interestingly, blends the fundamental rights analysis with the duty analysis, finding that 
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Article, the important point is that, regardless of the theory, these courts 
have held that students can enforce education clauses in state constitutions 
against the state. Even when courts have refused to enforce a state’s 
education clause, the courts have not gone so far as to suggest the 
education clause is irrelevant to the delivery of educational opportunity or 
that the state is free to disregard it.65 Rather, these courts have reasoned that 
while the state constitution may obligate the state to deliver certain 
educational opportunities, the specific language in an education clause or 
the state’s system of separation of powers affords the state legislature broad 
discretion in carrying out its education duty.66 On this basis, these courts 
find that they lack the authority to second-guess the legislature.67 In short, 
all state constitutions establish education duties and rights. The difference 
between states is the extent to which courts have been willing to enforce 
those duties and rights to prevent deprivations of educational opportunity. 
Most have been willing to do so. 
2. Ensuring Equal and Adequate Education.—Depending on the 
particular state, the precise right at stake in school finance cases is the right 
to equal or adequate educational opportunities.68 Money often takes center 
stage only because it substantially affects educational opportunity in 
general and those critical inputs that make educational opportunity 
meaningful. While money is highly relevant in accessing educational 
opportunities, it is not singularly determinative of whether the state has 
provided an adequate or equal education. Courts often spend just as much, 
if not more, time addressing substantive issues relating to the effect of 
teachers, facilities, transportation, and class sizes on educational 
opportunity.69 In each of these areas, the general inquiry is whether the state 
policies and practices provide students with learning opportunities and 
 
students have a fundamental right to sound basic education. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 
365, 373 (N.C. 2004). 
65 Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (Mass. 2005) (Marshall, C.J., concurring); 
Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 815 (Ala. 2002). 
66 See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017–18 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); 
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 164 (Ga. 1981); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 
1178, 1185, 1189 (Ill. 1996). 
67 See generally Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of 
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 714–
15 (2010) (discussing judicial outcomes and finding that one-third dismiss school finance cases based 
on separation of powers concerns). 
68 Compare Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215 (focusing on adequacy), with Serrano, 557 P.2d at 957–58 
(focusing on whether student subgroups had been treated equally). 
69 Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 169–73 (S.C. 2014) (examining 
transportation, teachers, and district size); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 
801 N.E.2d 326, 333–36 (N.Y. 2003) (evaluating teachers, facilities, and the instrumentalities of 
learning). 
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resources that are likely or reasonably calculated to produce educational 
success for students, which is typically measured through proficiency 
levels on end-of-grade standardized tests, graduation rates, and 
preparedness for higher education, employment, and the responsibilities of 
citizenship.70 In short, the precise legal challenge in most cases is based on 
the theory that the state must ensure that existing educational inputs and 
opportunities are sufficient to produce academic success. 
3. States Must Meet the Unique Needs of Disadvantaged Students 
and Districts.—In general, the state’s obligation is to ensure all 
students have the opportunity to succeed in school.71 However, students 
from various demographic groups—including but not limited to low-
income students, English Language Learners, students with disabilities, and 
racial minorities—often face unique challenges or barriers to academic 
achievement.72 Courts have held that states have a duty to implement 
policies and provide the resources necessary to address those challenges.73 
As the court in Abbott v. Burke74 wrote, “If the claim is that these students 
simply cannot make it, the constitutional answer is, give them a chance.”75 
Even if the state cannot eliminate students’ challenges, “students are 
constitutionally entitled to that help,” and “in some cases for disadvantaged 
students to receive a thorough and efficient education, the students will 
require above-average access to education resources.”76 
A state’s education system and its particular policies may be very 
effective in serving the needs of some students and districts, but ineffective 
 
70 See, e.g., Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 381 (N.C. 2004) (stating that, 
consistent with the court’s early opinion, plaintiffs presented evidence of “(1) comparative standardized 
test score data; [and] (2) student graduation rates, employment potential, post-secondary education 
success (and/or lack thereof)”); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294–95 (N.J. 1973), aff’d as 
modified on reargument, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973), and on reh’g, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (stating that 
the education clause’s “purpose was to impose on the legislature a duty of providing for a thorough and 
efficient system of free schools, capable of affording to every child such instruction as is necessary to 
fit it for the ordinary duties of citizenship”); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 
475, 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (examining student test scores and graduation rates). 
71 See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 337 (quoting Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 517) 
(stating that a sound basic education “must still ‘be placed within reach of all students,’ including those 
who ‘present with socioeconomic deficits’”). 
72 Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d at 389 n.16 (defining the at-risk students whom the state was 
obligated to assist). 
73 Id. at 390–91 (indicating state had failed to identify and support at-risk students); Abbeville Cty. 
Sch. Dist., 767 S.E.2d at 179 (emphasizing the need to address “school districts filled with students of 
the most disadvantaged socioeconomic background, exposing students in those school districts to 
substandard educational inputs” and rejecting the state’s argument “that nothing can be done to improve 
those school districts’ unacceptable performances”). 
74 Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
75 Id. at 403. 
76 Id. at 402 (quoting Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 495 A.2d 376, 388 (N.J. 1985)). 
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in serving others. For instance, a financing system that relies heavily on 
local property tax will generate more than sufficient funds to deliver a 
quality education in most metropolitan suburbs, but will be insufficient in 
rural areas or impoverished inner-city neighborhoods.77 Likewise, a state 
standard that requires that students develop the ability to read short books 
independently by the end of the first grade might be reasonable for a 
substantial portion of students, but is highly unlikely for a substantial 
portion of disadvantaged students unless the education system intervenes 
with additional supports for those students.78 Moreover, the gap in learning 
outcomes between disadvantaged students and others will only expand over 
time in the absence of early and continued supports.79 
Based on evidence of this sort, courts have forced states to intervene 
in particular districts and on behalf of particular student groups, reasoning 
that these students’ ability to obtain equal or adequate education 
opportunities rests on these interventions. In other words, states have an 
obligation to ensure that their education policies and practices—even if 
good in theory or effective for most students—work for those students who 
are most in need. Addressing the needs of these students has been the 
driving inquiry of most all school finance litigation. 
4. Any Policies that Interfere with the Delivery of Equal and 
Adequate Education Are Subject to Challenges.—Because the 
right at stake in these cases is an adequate or equal education, not adequate 
or equal money, the right is sufficiently flexible to encompass any number 
of educational policies that affect educational opportunity.80 Not only has 
the litigation encompassed those obvious things like teachers and buildings 
that money can buy, it has encompassed things that money cannot buy. For 
instance, plaintiffs in Sheff v. O’Neill81 successfully demonstrated that 
school district boundaries caused segregation and that segregation was a 
 
77 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (comparing funding 
available in Alamo Heights to Edgewood); see generally Bruce J. Biddle & David C. Berliner, Unequal 
School Funding in the United States, 59 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 48 (2002) (providing an overview of 
traditional school funding practices and the inequalities they produce). 
78 See generally Farah Z. Ahmad & Katie Hamm, The School-Readiness Gap and Preschool 
Benefits for Children of Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 12, 2013), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/report/2013/11/12/79252/the-school-readiness-gap-
and-preschool-benefits-for-children-of-color/ [https://perma.cc/LZH6-2BJN] (discussing the school 
readiness gap between certain demographic groups and their different language and reading levels). 
79 See generally Roland G. Fryer & Steven D. Levitt, Falling Behind: As Children Move Through 
School, the Black-White Achievement Gap Expands, 4 EDUC. NEXT 64 (2004). 
80 James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 308–10 (1999); Derek W. Black, 
Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. 
L. REV. 373, 390–403 (2012) (discussing the potential breadth of constitutional rights to education). 
81 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). 
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cause of educational inequality in the state.82 Thus, the court held that 
rigidly segregated school districts deprived students of their right to equal 
education opportunity.83 
More recently, litigants in other states have used theories of adequacy 
and equity to challenge teacher and charter school policies. A trial court in 
California held that teacher tenure and seniority that keep grossly 
ineffective teachers in the classroom deprive students of their fundamental 
right to education under the California Constitution.84 Litigants in 
Massachusetts have employed a similar strategy in challenging the state’s 
cap on the number of charters.85 They argue that the cap deprives students 
of a constitutionally sufficient education because it prevents them from 
exiting their constitutionally deficient traditional public schools for better 
charter schools.86 While the courts have yet to rule there, the claim has 
helped generate legislative discussion regarding lifting the cap.87 
Regardless of the final resolution of these newer cases, they 
demonstrate the breadth of circumstances to which the constitutional right 
to an equal or adequate education might apply. Any state policy 
substantially impairing educational opportunity is potentially subject to 
constitutional challenge. Plaintiffs’ primary hurdle is not at the theoretical 
level of whether constitutional rights to education limit some particular 
type of education policy regarding teachers, financing, segregation, or 
discipline, but in making the factual showing that the policy or practice in 
question—whatever it might be—is the actual cause of substantial and 
systematic injury to students. 
5. The Ultimate Responsibility for Educational Opportunities Rests 
with the State.—The foregoing principles rest on one final 
 
82 Id. at 1270–71. 
83 Id. at 1288–89. 
84 Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *3 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014), rev’d, 
202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), as modified, 2016 WL 4443590 (Cal. Ct. App. May 3, 
2016), reh’g denied, 2016 WL 4443590 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016); Verified Amended Complaint at 
¶7, Davids v. State, No. 201415-A-043 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 30, 2014); see also Order Denying Motion 
to Dismiss, Davids v. State, No. 201415-A-043 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/2015-march-motion-to-dismiss-denied--a-043---davids-
wright.pdf [https://perma.cc/G66R-22BL] (New York case surviving motion to dismiss). 
85 Derek Black, New Lawsuit Claims Cap on Charter Schools Is Unconstitutional, EDUC. L. PROF. 
BLOG (Mar. 17, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/2015/03/new-lawsuit-claims-
cap-on-charter-schools-is-unconstitutional-.html [https://perma.cc/GKQ7-NPA7]. 
86 Id. 
87 Nina Rees, Too Much Left to Chance: States with Charter School Caps Should Stop Abandoning 
Students to the Whims of a Lottery, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/
opinion/knowledge-bank/2015/04/08/massachusetts-should-lift-charter-school-cap [https://perma.cc/
9PGP-RWRQ] (discussing Massachusetts Governor’s calls to lift the cap). 
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foundational principle: the state is ultimately responsible for the 
educational opportunities that students do and do not receive.88 While 
variations in educational opportunity and students’ academic achievement 
may be random in some respects, the state has the responsibility to monitor 
educational opportunity and intervene to address policies and practices that 
interfere with students’ ability to receive an equal or quality education.89 
On this basis, courts have forced states to correct problems occurring at the 
local level.90 
For decades, states left local districts to their own devices in funding 
and determining the academic rigor in schools.91 When certain districts 
produced poor academic outcomes, the state blamed school districts and/or 
the students.92 According to the state, school districts were mismanaged or 
their students faced too many personal challenges.93 Either way, academic 
failure was not the state’s fault. This, moreover, was the price of local 
autonomy, which states claimed was an important goal to pursue.94 
School finance litigation eliminated these defenses. The responsibility 
for academic success and the school funding necessary to deliver it now 
falls primarily on the state.95 As the court in Rose explained: 
The sole responsibility for providing the system of common schools is that of 
our General Assembly. It is a duty—it is a constitutional mandate placed by 
the people on the 138 members of that body who represent those selfsame 
people. 
The General Assembly must not only establish the system, but it must monitor 
it on a continuing basis so that it will always be maintained in a constitutional 
 
88 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989) (“[T]he sole 
responsibility for providing the system of common schools lies with the General Assembly.” (emphasis 
in original)); Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Pub. Sch. Fin. Sys.), 765 A.2d 673, 676 (N.H. 2000) 
(“The State may not shift any of this constitutional responsibility to local communities. . . .”). 
89 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211. 
90 Id. 
91 Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV. 773, 
781 (1992). 
92  Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 398 (N.J. 1990) (“The State contends that the education currently 
offered in these poorer urban districts is tailored to the students’ present need, that these students simply 
cannot now benefit from the kind of vastly superior course offerings found in the richer districts.”); 
Abbott I, 495 A.2d 376, 384–86 (N.J. 1985) (blaming local mismanagement); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. 
v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 179 (S.C. 2014) (noting the state’s position that “nothing can be done to 
improve those [high poverty] school districts’ unacceptable performances”). 
93 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 92. 
94 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973). 
95 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 216; Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 408–10 (imposing duty on the state to fund 
education, notwithstanding its claims of local mismanagement). 
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manner. The General Assembly must carefully supervise it, so that there is no 
waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, at any level.96 
Thus, more practically, if some local districts lack the funding to 
deliver a quality education, the state has the duty to supplement those 
districts or come up with a new statewide funding scheme.97 If districts 
cannot hire or retain the quality teachers necessary to ensure effective 
instruction and learning, the state has the responsibility to take the steps 
necessary to improve teacher quality.98 If local districts waste the resources 
the state gives them to hire quality teachers and help develop existing ones, 
the state has the responsibility to stop this waste.99 In short, states cannot 
avoid their constitutional obligation to ensure appropriate educational 
opportunities by pointing to the failures of local school leaders or the 
extraordinary disadvantages their students face outside school. 
C. Implications for School Discipline Reform 
In the context of the foregoing principles, suspensions and expulsions 
raise constitutional concerns well beyond the basic procedural due process 
rules that courts have traditionally applied.100 First, when a student is 
removed from school, the student is not just losing access to some statutory 
benefit that the state is free to condition or limit. Rather, the student is 
losing access to a constitutional right or an opportunity that the state is 
constitutionally obligated to deliver. This should trigger heightened 
scrutiny, which requires more important and more carefully thought-out 
justifications for school exclusions than schools have currently offered. 
Second, where discipline policy affects the overall quality of education and 
academic outcomes in school,101 the constitutional right to education can 
 
96 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211. 
97 Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 408–10; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III), 861 N.E.2d 
50, 53 (N.Y. 2006) (evaluating state’s new funding plan after prior finding of liability); DeRolph v. 
State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737–40 (Ohio 1997) (detailing various flaws in state’s funding scheme). 
98 Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist., 767 S.E.2d at 171 (rejecting finding that state had done enough to 
ensure access to quality teachers); CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 340 (N.Y. 2003) (finding that state’s 
funding policies were a causal factor in New York City’s inability to hire quality teachers). 
99 Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979) (requiring “careful state and local 
supervision to prevent waste and to monitor pupil, teacher and administrative competency”); Rose, 
790 S.W.2d at 193 (“An adequate school system must also include careful and comprehensive 
supervision at all levels to monitor personnel performance and minimize waste. If and where waste and 
mismanagement exist, including but not limited to improper nepotism, favoritism, and misallocation of 
school monies, they must be eliminated, through state intervention if necessary.”). 
100 See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding that due process requires that 
schools afford students notice and an opportunity to respond prior to suspension). 
101 See infra notes 249–311 and accompanying text. 
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obligate a state to intervene in and manage the discipline system in a way 
that furthers educational quality rather than undermines it. 
Third, the disproportionate burden of school discipline on at-risk 
students should trigger the state’s obligation to help at-risk students 
overcome academic barriers. At-risk students happen to be the ones most 
often disciplined in schools.102 Thus, they suffer the most direct negative 
academic consequences of suspension and expulsion. The states’ obligation 
to both avoid this outcome and assist students in achieving better outcomes 
should require the state to take specific action to alter existing discipline 
policy and practice. The recognition of this point would further offer an 
important counter to the traditional notion that consequences for student 
misbehavior rightly falls solely on the misbehaving student. 
Finally, the foregoing principles also offer a strong rejoinder to the 
notion that the fault in discipline policy lies with misguided exercises of 
local discretion. Because schools exercise enormous discretion in making 
discipline decisions, states would instinctively respond that variances in the 
discipline decisions that occur across schools and districts—whether good 
or bad—are not of the state’s making. Thus, the state cannot be held liable. 
School finance precedent, however, suggests that local districts are not so 
easily separated from the state because the state retains the responsibility to 
monitor and direct their activities toward appropriate educational outcomes. 
Each of these points is further explored in Parts II and III. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION REQUIRES  
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF DISCIPLINE POLICIES 
In the late 1990s, a few individual students and their attorneys 
happened on the idea that school finance precedent might offer a basis to 
limit their exclusion from school. If school finance precedent rendered 
education a fundamental or constitutional right, some form of heightened 
scrutiny—either intermediate or strict scrutiny—should apply when states 
take that education away from students. These discipline cases, however, 
were uncoordinated and idiosyncratic. Relatively few cases have been filed 
and even fewer decided by a high court. Those few state courts that issued 
opinions in these cases afforded the key constitutional issues varying 
degrees of attention and reached conflicting results. For purposes of 
analysis, the decisions can be grouped into four categories, each of which is 
explored in Section II.A. None of these approaches have proven to be a 
good model for future litigation. The interplay between discipline policies 
 
102 LOSEN & MARTINEZ, supra note 5, at 8 tbl.1 (showing the high rates of suspension for racial 
minorities, students with disabilities, and English Language Learners). 
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and the constitutional right to education remains grossly undertheorized 
and past litigation strategies seriously flawed. Section II.B details those 
flaws. Section II.C then offers a new litigation strategy and framework for 
correcting those flaws. 
A. Past Responses to Extending School Finance Precedent to Discipline 
1. Students Forfeit Their Rights Through Misbehavior.—Two courts 
treat the development of the constitutional right to education in school 
finance precedent as practically irrelevant to discipline. The supreme courts 
of Massachusetts and Wyoming reasoned that the right to education is 
subject to a student’s good behavior.103 That is, misbehaving students 
forfeit the right to education.104 Massachusetts’s highest court wrote that the 
state constitution imposes on the state a “duty to provide children an 
adequate public education[, which] includes the duty to provide a safe and 
secure environment in which all children can learn.”105 But the court 
reasoned that “a student’s interest in a public education can be forfeited by 
violating school rules,” or in the instant case, by bringing what the school 
termed a weapon to school.106 Thus, the heightened scrutiny that might 
otherwise have applied was never triggered.107 Instead, the default rational 
basis review applied.108 The Wyoming Supreme Court, in contrast, 
recognized that education was a fundamental right that could trigger strict 
scrutiny, but similar to Massachusetts emphasized that schools have the 
authority to prohibit certain behavior and a student can “temporarily forfeit 
educational services through his own conduct.”109 This fact, as much as any 
justification the school might offer for exclusion, weighed heavily on the 
court’s analysis. “The actual receipt of educational services is accordingly 
contingent upon appropriate conduct in conformity with state law and 
school rules.”110 In sum, under these courts’ approaches, the existence of a 
constitutional or fundamental right to equitable or adequate educational 
opportunities does almost nothing to increase the protections afforded to 
suspended and expelled students. 
 
103 Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1096 (Mass. 1995); In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 
874 (Wyo. 2004).  
104 Doe, 653 N.E.2d at 1096. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1097. 
108 Id. at 1096. 
109 In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 874 (Wyo. 2004).  
110 Id. 
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2. School Exclusion Infringes a Fundamental Right and Triggers 
Strict Scrutiny.—While forfeiture theory may remain as a 
motivation to reach a particular doctrinal conclusion, other courts have 
focused more on whether school finance precedent creates a right that 
would trigger heightened scrutiny.111 They are split on the answer to this 
question but share a similarly cursory approach to the analysis. Those 
courts that find a right generally assume or infer its existence without any 
serious analysis of precedent on the issues. For instance, in Phillip Leon M. 
v. Greenbrier County Board of Education,112 the West Virginia Supreme 
Court held that strict scrutiny applies to school exclusion, reasoning that 
prior school finance precedent indicates education is a fundamental right.113 
While prior cases had treated education as a fundamental right, the context 
there was quite different. The issue in those prior school finance cases was 
about the “discriminatory classification found in the educational financing 
system,” which raises class-based discrimination concerns and systemic 
statewide injuries.114 The court in Phillip Leon was willing to import the 
precedent from school finance without accounting for these distinctions. A 
few years later, a New Jersey trial court recognized the importance of the 
state constitutional right to education and held that “expulsion of an 
adjudicated juvenile by his local school board does not sound the death 
knell for his constitutional right to receive alternative education in another 
setting.”115 The court did not specifically frame its analysis in terms of strict 
scrutiny, but clearly implied the state lacked a justification for entirely 
excluding students from education, even those having engaged in the most 
serious types of misconduct.116 The most careful examination of the 
question may have been by the Wyoming Supreme Court, but as suggested 
above, its analysis, in effect, elevated the notion of forfeiture based on 
misbehavior above that of forcing the state to justify exclusion.117 
 
111 See, e.g., Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 913 (W. Va. 1996), 
holding modified by Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cty. Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340 (W. Va. 1997) (“[W]hen 
a state acts to the disadvantage of some suspect class or to impinge upon a fundamental right explicitly 
or implicitly protected by the West Virginia Constitution, strict scrutiny will apply, and the state will 
have to prove that its action is necessary because of a compelling government interest.”). 
112 484 S.E.2d at 909. 
113 Id. at 910 (relying on the basic previous holding in Pauley v. Kelly that education is a 
fundamental right). 
114 Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979). 
115 State ex rel. G.S., 749 A.2d 902, 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).  
116 Id. at 904, 908 (finding that a student who “participat[ed] in [a] bomb threat incident” in a 
district with a “history of several such incidents” still has a right to receive alternative education until he 
graduates or turns nineteen years old). 
117 In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 874 (Wyo. 2004) (“[T]he fundamental right to an opportunity for an 
education does not guarantee that a student cannot temporarily forfeit educational services through his 
own conduct.”). 
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3. School Exclusion Does Not Infringe Any Fundamental or 
Constitutional Right to Education.—Those courts that reject the 
existence of a constitutional right that triggers heightened scrutiny do so on 
equally simplistic reasoning. They conclude that past school finance cases 
never specifically and explicitly declared such a right—even though those 
courts never rejected such a right either. For instance, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts wrote that its prior school funding decision “should 
not be construed as holding that the Massachusetts Constitution guarantees 
each individual student the fundamental right to an education.”118 The 
rejection of a fundamental right in the discipline case was premised on the 
notion that the prior school funding case had held that the state had a duty 
to afford students an adequate education, not that education is a 
fundamental right.119 While this distinction is technically accurate, it 
entirely ignores the fact that the school funding plaintiffs had premised the 
state’s duty to deliver adequate education on the notion that students had a 
constitutional right to education. The Supreme Judicial Court in the funding 
case had written 
The defendants argue that the placement of the education provision in “The 
Frame of Government,” rather than in the “Declaration of Rights,” 
undermines the plaintiffs’ argument that they have a constitutional “right” to 
education. . . . [T]his argument is unpersuasive; we believe that the placement 
of the education provisions in Part II, The Frame of Government, is a forceful 
statement that education is both a duty of and a prerequisite for republican 
government. And, if “legislatures and magistrates” have a constitutional duty 
to educate, then members of the Commonwealth have a correlative 
constitutional right to be educated.120 
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s treatment of the issues was even more 
cursory, dismissing the fundamental right to education as a limitation on 
discipline in one short paragraph. It wrote that while “we have construed 
the [education clause in the state constitution] as pertinent to the issue of 
the constitutionality of school financing,” the court has “not construed this 
language in the context of student discipline to mean that a fundamental 
right to education exists in this state, and we decline to do so today.”121 It 
offered no explanation for rejecting the right other than that no prior court 
 
118 Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass. 1995). 
119 Id. 
120 McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 527 n.23 (Mass. 1993) (citing 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978)). 
121 Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Neb. 1997). 
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had established the right. In the absence of such a right, Nebraska and 
Massachusetts would only apply rational basis to school exclusions.122 
4. School Exclusion Implicates Statutory Rights and Triggers 
Intermediate Scrutiny.—The final two states to address school 
discipline in light of a possible constitutional right to education fall 
squarely between the rational basis approach of Massachusetts and 
Nebraska and the strict scrutiny approach of West Virginia, New Jersey, 
and Wyoming. Mississippi applied a review closely resembling 
intermediate scrutiny without explicitly naming it as such, while North 
Carolina explicitly adopted intermediate scrutiny. 
In Mississippi, no school finance precedent existed to establish 
education as a fundamental right, nor did the state constitution have an 
education clause suggesting as much.123 But in Clinton Municipal Separate 
School District v. Byrd,124 a long-term suspension case, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court indicated that “the right to a minimally adequate public 
education created and entailed by the laws of this state is one we can only 
label fundamental.”125 The court did not, however, apply strict scrutiny in 
evaluating the school’s disciplinary policy. 
Instead, the court indicated that the question was whether the 
punishment “furthers a substantial legitimate interest of the school 
district.”126 The standard articulation of intermediate scrutiny is that it 
requires an “important” government interest and means that “substantially” 
further the important interest, whereas rational basis requires a “legitimate” 
state interest and means that are “rationally related” or simply “further” the 
legitimate interest.127 The standard offered in Clinton does not squarely fit 
in either, but insofar as it includes the idea of substantiality, it would appear 
to require a justification in excess of rational basis. Yet, the court’s later 
emphasis on deferring to schools sounds in rational basis review:  
The authority vested in school boards consistent with this constitutional 
limitation includes substantial discretion with respect to the administration of 
punishments to students who violate school rules. This Court has heretofore 
 
122 Id.; Doe, 653 N.E.2d at 1097. 
123 Thro, supra note 21, at 1661; see also Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 
237, 240 (Miss. 1985) (noting that the obligation to provide education came from statutes). 
124 477 So. 2d 237. 
125 Id. at 240. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 687 
(4th ed. 2011) (describing the requirements for each standard of review). 
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determined that it will not interfere with school boards in the exercise of such 
discretion so long as constitutional parameters are not transgressed.128  
Moreover, the court justified its conclusion that the students’ 
punishment met the standard by pointing to federal cases involving similar 
facts, but which had applied rational basis review in the context of 
substantive due process challenges.129 
A decade later, another Mississippi student challenged a ten-day 
suspension and denial of alternative education, which combined to severely 
impact his grades and course credit in school.130 The Mississippi Supreme 
Court restated its earlier constitutional holding in Clinton,131 but refrained 
from deciding the case on constitutional grounds. It reasoned that a state 
statute requiring districts to provide alternative education offered a 
sufficient ground to rule in the student’s favor.132 The statute applied to all 
suspended and expelled students, regardless of the reasons for or length of 
suspension.133 Thus, the district’s denial of access to alternative school 
during the suspension was prohibited.134 
The most recent decision addressing the intersection of discipline and 
the constitutional right to education was decided in North Carolina in King 
ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort County Board of Education.135 Like 
Mississippi, the court decided the case on statutory rather than 
constitutional grounds, holding that students have a statutory right to 
alternative education.136 Background concerns about the constitutional right 
to education heavily influenced the court’s reasoning. The court wrote:  
[A] fundamental right to alternative education does not exist under the state 
constitution. Nevertheless, insofar as the General Assembly has provided a 
statutory right to alternative education, a suspended student excluded from 
alternative education has a state constitutional right to know the reason for her 
exclusion.137  
 
128 Clinton, 477 So. 2d at 240–41 (citing Shows v. Freeman, 230 So. 2d 63, 64 (Miss. 1969)). 
129 Id. at 241. 
130 In re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 115–17 (Miss. 1996). 
131 Id. at 114 (citing Clinton, 477 So. 2d at 240) (“[W]e agree that T.H. has a fundamental right to 
an education as guaranteed by Article 3, Section 14 of the Mississippi Constitution.”). 
132 Id. at 116 (discussing Mississippi statutes in effect at the time).  
133 Id. (“In the statute, the Legislature makes no exceptions for particular categories of offenses. 
Suspended or expelled students are eligible for the alternate programs where they exist.”). 
134 Id. at 117. 
135 704 S.E.2d 259, 261 (2010). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
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This constitutional right to know—rather than simply a statutory right to 
alternative education alone—triggered intermediate scrutiny of school 
exclusions. 
This “constitutional right to know” sounds very similar to the 
procedural due process right to notice first articulated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Goss v. Lopez.138 Goss required schools to apprise students of the 
evidence against them and the reason for suspension.139 The court in King, 
however, was referencing a much different right. The point in Goss was to 
allow students to contest the accuracy of the evidence. The right in King is 
to know the reason for exclusion and question, regardless of the evidence, 
whether it is a normatively good reason. In other words, even if a student 
stole another student’s cookies, stealing cookies may not be a compelling 
enough reason to expel a student. 
This right to contest the sufficiency of the basis for exclusion was 
previously unheard of in state cases. The court in King only recognized 
such a unique right to avoid conflict with the state constitution’s guarantee 
to every student of “an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in 
our public schools” and its prior holdings that equal access to and 
participation in education “is a fundamental right.”140 Whereas deprivation 
of the fundamental right to education itself may have triggered strict 
scrutiny, the court reasoned that the statutory right to alternative education 
combined with this new right to know only required intermediate 
scrutiny.141 
B. Flaws and Limitations in the Litigation 
While the foregoing cases differ in the scrutiny applied, they are 
similar in their assumptions, flaws, and apparent uncertainty as to how to 
best approach the issues. To varying degrees, they all avoided serious 
analysis of the fundamental constitutional questions at issue. Rather than 
evaluate the existence of a right to education and the state’s justification for 
taking it away, they obfuscated the issues by focusing on forfeiture theory, 
considering alternative school as a viable option, or addressing the issues 
solely in the context of cases involving serious misconduct. In all fairness, 
whether state constitutional education clauses create individual rights is a 
 
138 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
139 Id. at 581 (requiring that a student “be given oral or written notice of the charges against him 
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present 
his side of the story”). 
140 King, 704 S.E.2d at 261–62. 
141 Id. at 263–65. 
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complex question,142 and this complexity may help explain why no court 
clearly addresses it.143 Nonetheless, the alternative grounds on which the 
courts decide the cases adds to their dissonance. The following Sections 
analyze each of these problems. 
1. Bad Facts Make Bad Law: Choosing the Wrong Cases.—One 
explanation for why the legal analysis in prior discipline cases is 
underdeveloped is that the facts disincentivized courts from seriously 
entertaining plaintiffs’ claims. In effect, the facts of some of the cases 
involved sufficiently serious misconduct that the students may have been 
unable to reverse their suspension or expulsion under any level of scrutiny. 
In each of the cases discussed in Section II.A., the students admitted to 
engaging in serious misbehavior that potentially posed a danger to others or 
themselves. The offenses included firearm possession, alcohol 
consumption, the sale of marijuana, engaging in a multi-person brawl, 
possession of a hidden blade in a lipstick case, and possession of a 
switchblade knife.144 
In the context of serious misbehavior, a court may have relatively little 
incentive to parse through the analysis of school finance precedent and 
fundamental or constitutional rights recognition, much less declare a new 
right. Moreover, even if a court were to apply heightened scrutiny, serious 
misbehavior narrows the contested issues in problematic ways. Students 
who engage in weapon- or drug-related misbehavior, for instance, are not 
in a good position to challenge the state’s authority to remove them from 
school. No one seriously challenges the state’s authority to exclude 
students with drugs or weapons from regular school. Schools clearly have a 
substantial or compelling interest in safety.145 Thus, even under strict 
scrutiny, the most a student could do is dispute whether a school’s response 
to the misbehavior was narrowly tailored.146 And the best remedy the 
student is likely to get is assignment to alternative school. 
 
142 See generally Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to Education, 
48 GA. L. REV. 949, 951–53 (2014) (arguing that school finance cases have not created “individual 
rights to education”). 
143 Id. (arguing that “rights talk” in state constitutional cases is more “rhetoric” than “reality”). 
144 King, 704 S.E.2d at 261 (fight involving multiple students); In re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 112 
(Miss. 1996) (attended school activity having bought and consumed alcohol illegally); In re RM, 
102 P.3d 868, 870 (Wyo. 2004) (“selling marijuana to other students while on school grounds”); Phillip 
Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 911 (W. Va. 1996) (firearm at school); Doe 
v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1090 (Mass. 1995) (blade in lipstick case); Kolesnick v. 
Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Neb. 1997) (switchblade knife). 
145 See, e.g., King, 704 S.E.2d at 265; In re RM, 102 P.3d at 873 (“There is little doubt that the 
safety and welfare of students in the state are of utmost importance.”). 
146 See, e.g., In re RM, 102 P.3d at 874; Phillip Leon, 484 S.E.2d at 916. 
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These types of facts, nonetheless, have dominated past litigation—
most likely because these students have the most at stake and litigation is 
their only option. In most of the above cases, students have been denied 
both the right to attend regular school and an alternative. Without judicial 
intervention, their public education is entirely over until the next school 
term or potentially longer. In contrast, a student who engages in less 
serious behavior, such as disrespecting a teacher, is more likely to receive a 
suspension ranging from one to ten days, which theoretically does not 
prevent the student from normal progress in school, but which still entail 
the high burdens of litigation to challenge. Yet, it is these very types of 
cases that need to be brought. 
2. Better Facts Would Make Better Law.—To reform school 
discipline and protect the constitutional right to education, meaningful 
litigation must avoid weapon and drug cases and, instead, focus on 
everyday discipline and exclusion. Drug and weapon offenses only account 
for a very small portion of school exclusions.147 In Indiana, for instance, 
they account for only about 5% of all suspensions and expulsions.148 A full 
51% of suspensions were for “disruptive behavior” and another 44% fell in 
the catchall of “other.”149 In other words, 95% of suspensions in Indiana 
involved relatively minor misbehavior.150 It is here, in the predominant 
circumstances in which suspension and expulsion occur, where students’ 
constitutional claims are strongest. 
A school that regularly suspended disruptive, disrespectful, and 
defiant students (and potentially expelled repeat offenders) would face two 
substantial hurdles under heightened review. The school would lack an 
obvious substantial or compelling interest in excluding these students. 
School safety is a compelling interest,151 but these students do not pose a 
serious physical threat to themselves or others, as would students who 
brought real weapons or drugs to school. Likewise, a school likely has a 
very important or compelling interest in maintaining an orderly learning 
environment,152 but an orderly school environment is a far more contextual 
 
147 See, e.g., LOSEN & MARTINEZ, supra note 5, at 20; CONN. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 5, 
at 50. 
148 Rausch & Skiba, supra note 5, at 2. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 6. 
151 See, e.g., In re RM, 102 P.3d at 873 (agreeing with district’s assertion that safety is a compelling 
interest and adding that “[t]here is little doubt that the safety and welfare of students in the state are of 
utmost importance”). 
152 For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a school’s authority to infringe on 
students’ free speech when it “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion 
of the rights of others.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
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concept. A school in which teachers spend most of their time settling 
students down and attempting to keep them focused on learning would 
probably fall in the category of disorderly, but does the occasional student 
outburst or disruption seriously undermine order and learning or is it 
simply something to be expected from time to time? Either way, social 
science indicates that using suspensions and expulsions as a primary means 
of dealing with minor student misbehavior does not work.153 To the 
contrary, it often makes matters worse. A school’s gut instinct that 
removing disruptive students breeds order and respect might suffice under 
permissive rational basis review, but would require far more validation 
under heightened scrutiny. 
The second hurdle in excluding students for routine misbehavior 
would be demonstrating that exclusion is narrowly tailored. A denial of 
both regular and alternative education is an overbroad response.154 While 
some courts have found that total exclusion is a narrowly tailored response 
to serious misbehavior, the same does not follow for disrespectful students. 
They do not pose safety threats and, in alternative school, no longer pose a 
disruption to the regular school environment.155 Schools that deny these 
students alternative education do so simply to avoid the financial cost, but 
avoiding costs alone would be insufficient to render exclusion narrowly 
tailored.156 
But as emphasized above, access to quality alternative schools is a 
distraction. With minor misbehavior, any number of more moderate 
 
153 See infra notes 249–76. 
154 Studies consistently show that suspension just makes matters worse for both the punished 
student and his peers. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, Are Zero 
Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools?: An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 852 (2008) (surveying the literature detailing the negative effects of zero tolerance and 
suspensions); Linda M. Raffaele Mendez et al., School Demographic Variables and Out-of-School 
Suspension Rates: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of a Large, Ethnically Diverse School 
District, 39 PSYCHOL. IN THE SCHS. 259 (2002). They also show that positive behavioral supports, 
rather than suspension, are effective. Catherine P. Bradshaw et al., Examining the Effects of Schoolwide 
Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports on Student Outcomes, 12 J. OF POSITIVE BEHAV. 
INTERVENTIONS 133, 133 (2010); see also GREG ANRIG, THE CENTURY FOUND., LESSONS FROM 
SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT GRANTS THAT WORKED 17–18 (2015), http://www.tcf.org/bookstore/
detail/lessons-from-school-improvement-grants-that-worked [https://perma.cc/SZ9U-UABR] (finding 
that when properly implemented, interventions other than referral to the office for discipline work the 
overwhelming majority of the time). 
155 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in discussing model alternative schools, emphasized that 
they are “created for students who have difficulty with the more impersonal environment of the typical 
large high school. Many alternative schools cater to students who have a combination of learning, 
behavior, and family problems and need a supportive learning environment.” Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 
IV), 710 A.2d 450, 532 (N.J. 1998). 
156 Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 915 (W. Va. 1996) 
(recognizing the challenge of funding alternative schools, but rejecting cost as a legitimate basis for 
denying students’ access). 
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responses ranging from detention or lost privileges to thoughtful 
conversations with counselors or principals are just as—if not more—
effective in protecting the students’ right to education while also 
maintaining order.157 These, of course, are just the low-cost ways of dealing 
with misbehavior. A large body of research shows that schools and students 
would be best served to institute positive behavioral supports or restorative 
justice programs.158 These programs remediate misbehavior and often 
reduce it in the first instance, whereas punitive discipline tends to 
undermine behavioral and academic outcomes.159 
In sum, the deference courts might afford schools regarding students 
who bring weapons or drugs to school does not exist with routine 
misbehaviors that lead to most school exclusions. Litigating serious 
misbehaviors, like the focus on alternative schools, has distracted from the 
key issues in school discipline and made student victories harder to secure. 
Litigation focused on nonserious misbehavior, in contrast, would place the 
state at a disadvantage, both in terms of articulating an important or 
compelling interest in punishment and in demonstrating that its chosen 
punishment is narrowly tailored. 
3. Avoiding the Key Constitutional Issues.—Determining whether a 
student has a constitutionally protected interest in education involves 
complexities that none of the foregoing cases explored. Past cases have 
avoided addressing the question. Two courts avoided serious consideration 
of the issue by reasoning the students have forfeited any potential education 
right.160 Two explicitly avoided the question by deciding the case on 
 
157 Reece L. Peterson, Ten Alternatives to Suspension, 18 IMPACT, Spring 2005, at 10, 
https://ici.umn.edu/products/impact/182/over5.html [https://perma.cc/ET69-72XL]; JOEL ROSCH & 
ANNE-MARIE ISELIN, CTR. FOR CHILD & FAM. POL’Y DUKE UNIV., ALTERNATIVES TO SUSPENSION 
(2010), https://childandfamilypolicy.duke.edu/pdfs/familyimpact/2010/Alternatives_to_Suspension.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P5XG-37PH]. 
158 See, e.g., ANRIG, supra note 154; Kelli Y. Beard & George Sugai, First Step to Success: An 
Early Intervention for Elementary Children at Risk for Antisocial Behavior, 29 BEHAV. DISORDERS 396 
(2004); Bradshaw et al., supra note 154; Douglas A. Cheney et al., A 2-Year Outcome Study of the 
Check, Connect, and Expect Intervention for Students at Risk for Severe Behavior Problems, 17 J. 
EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. DISORDERS 226 (2009); Anne Gregory et al., The Promise of Restorative 
Practices to Transform Teacher-Student Relationships and Achieve Equity in School Discipline, 25 J. 
EDUC. & PSYCHOL. CONSULTATION 1–29 (2015). 
159 See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 158; Beard & Sugai, supra note 158. 
160 Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1096 (Mass. 1995); Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. 
Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Neb. 1997).  
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statutory grounds.161 And two assumed the question required no further 
analysis because school finance had resolved it.162 
The North Carolina Supreme Court went the furthest in 
acknowledging the constitutional interests at stake, but still refused to 
directly rule on them. It acknowledged that a constitutional right to 
education would trigger strict scrutiny and rejecting the right would 
relegate problematic discipline policies to rational basis.163 Believing both 
to be bad results, the court sought to strike a middle ground and apply 
intermediate scrutiny.164 The problem is that it lacked any clear basis upon 
which to do so. Thus, it was compelled to articulate a previously unheard of 
“constitutional right to know” the reason for school exclusion.165 This right, 
however, did not actually impose a limitation of exclusion itself, but rather 
offered the court a justification for applying heightened scrutiny to the loss 
of the statutory right in alternative education.166 That the court would take 
such an awkward and unusual route toward its result reflects the 
significance of the underlying constitutional issues. 
To North Carolina and the other courts’ defense, no clearly defined 
roadmap to adjudicating individual personal constitutional education claims 
exists.167 Even if school finance precedent clearly declared an individual 
right, the precedent offers no guidance as to how to apply that individual 
 
161 King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 261 (N.C. 2010); In 
re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 115 (Miss. 1996) (stating that statutory grounds “offer[] this Court an 
attractive alternative to avoid delving into school discipline cases on a constitutional level”). 
162 Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 913–916 (W. Va. 1996); In re 
RM, 102 P.3d 868, 874 (Wyo. 2004). 
163 King, 704 S.E.2d at 262–64 (“The present case requires us to harmonize the rational basis test 
employed in school discipline cases with the strict scrutiny analysis that formed a part of this Court’s 
constitutional holding in school funding cases.”). 
164 Id. at 265 (“[I]ntermediate scrutiny strikes a practical balance between protecting student access 
to educational opportunities and empowering school officials to maintain safe and orderly schools.”). 
165 Id. at 261 (“In acknowledging a statutory right to alternative education, we stress that a 
fundamental right to alternative education does not exist under the state constitution. Nevertheless, 
insofar as the General Assembly has provided a statutory right to alternative education, a suspended 
student excluded from alternative education has a state constitutional right to know the reason for her 
exclusion. This right arises from the equal access provisions of Article IX, Section 2(1) of the North 
Carolina Constitution.”). 
166 Id. at 265 (“As applied to alternative education determinations, rational basis review 
undoubtedly upholds administrative decisions even in the absence of a proffered reason, as plaintiff 
experienced in the present case. But this Court’s previous recognition of state constitutional rights to 
equal educational access and a sound basic education compels more exacting review. Accordingly, we 
hold that alternative education decisions for students who receive long-term suspensions are reviewed 
under the state constitutional standard of intermediate scrutiny.” (citation omitted)). 
167 See generally Bauries, supra note 142, at 991–92 (“[T]he chief challenge in enforcing the 
education clauses of state constitutions is the ‘inherently nebulous’ nature of the quality-based terms in 
each clause. A common response to objections to the justiciability of education clauses based on the 
lack of judicially manageable standards is that courts interpret vague and subjective terminology in the 
Federal Constitution all the time.”). 
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right in the context of discipline. Courts deciding discipline cases would 
face a number of open questions regarding the level of scrutiny to apply, 
the state interests and methods that would suffice under the chosen 
scrutiny, and how the right might also alter the due process necessary prior 
to exclusion. 
Courts are disincentivized from addressing these difficult questions 
because a simpler, alternate roadmap is available. If a court decides on 
statutory or forfeiture grounds, a host of state and federal decisions dictate 
a straightforward analysis in which the only questions are whether the state 
has a rational basis for exclusion and whether the student received basic 
due process prior to exclusion.168 Thus, when confronted with constitutional 
discipline claims in this precedential context, the easiest solution for 
reluctant or uncertain courts is to assume that school finance precedent has 
not changed anything and that the default procedural due process and 
rational basis analysis remains in place. In short, transitioning from the 
traditional context in which education is only a statutory right to one in 
which education is a constitutional right is fraught with difficulty given the 
novelty of the constitutional issues involved. 
School finance precedent’s failure to answer key questions regarding 
how the doctrines articulated there might apply in other contexts and the 
disincentives to answering these questions in discipline cases help explain 
the seemingly inapposite and confused results in discipline cases. All of the 
courts recognized the constitutional implications of school exclusion, but 
none could find definite and satisfying answers in school finance 
precedent.169 As a result, they each found a way to skip the issue or 
minimize its relevance: Nebraska and Massachusetts by preempting the 
question based on forfeiture theory,170 Wyoming and West Virginia by 
 
168 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (requiring notice and opportunity to respond 
in all school exclusions); Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 923–24 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine which exact processes are required in 
school discipline); Ratner v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 16 F. App’x 140, 142 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s procedural due process claim and refusing to question the school’s justification for exclusion 
because “federal courts are not properly called upon to judge the wisdom of a zero tolerance policy . . . 
or of its application to” a particular student). See also Larry Bartlett & James McCullagh, Exclusion 
from the Educational Process in the Public Schools: What Process Is Now Due, 1993 BYU EDUC. & 
L.J. 1 (1993) (providing an overview of what due process requires in school discipline). 
169 See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095–97 (Mass. 1995); Clinton 
Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240–41 (Miss. 1985); Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. 
Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Neb. 1997); King, 704 S.E.2d at 261–62; Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier 
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 913–15 (W. Va. 1996); In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 872–74 (Wyo. 
2004). 
170 Doe, 653 N.E.2d at 1096; Kolesnick, 558 N.W.2d at 813. 
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resting the weight of their analysis on narrow tailoring,171 and Mississippi 
and North Carolina by awkwardly splitting the difference through statutory 
analysis.172 
4. The Unresolved Tension Between Education Rights and Education 
Duties.—The question of whether school finance precedent 
creates individual rights is really a question of the nature and scope of those 
rights. While school finance cases often refer to constitutional rights or 
interests,173 almost none of those cases involved the question of whether 
their state constitution’s education clause created an individual personal 
right to education. Rather, the cases addressed the state’s general systemic 
duty in education and the extent to which it obligates the state to create a 
quality or an equal system.174 In other words, school finance cases clearly 
impose an education duty on the state, but whether those duties correspond 
to an individual personal right is rarely explicitly decided.175 
The concept of a duty with no corresponding individual rights is 
troubling, but not unprecedented. Tort law, for instance, traditionally treats 
police and fire protection as public duties of local government, but those 
duties rarely create enforceable individual rights.176 When local government 
voluntarily provides a finite service to the public at large, it does not 
presumptively obligate itself to meet the needs and interests of each 
individual citizen.177 Were courts to recognize such a right, they would 
disincentivize government from taking on public duties in the first 
instance.178 
 
171 In re RM, 102 P.3d at 876; Phillip Leon, 484 S.E.2d at 914–16, holding modified by Cathe A. v. 
Doddridge Cty. Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340 (W. Va. 1997). 
172 King, 704 S.E.2d at 264–65; In re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 116–17 (Miss. 1996). 
173 See Bitner, supra note 20, at 779 (identifying sixteen states as recognizing education as a 
fundamental right, including Arizona, California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
174 See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993) 
(indicating the individual was enforcing a public duty); see generally Bauries, supra note 142, at 986–
89 (finding that education has been enforced primarily as a duty); Sonja Ralston Elder, Enforcing 
Public Educational Rights via a Private Right of Action, 1 DUKE F. L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 143–44 
(2009) (revealing that the overwhelming percentage of cases have been brought on behalf of a group of 
students or a school district and sought to force the state to carry out its duty to a group of students 
rather than the rights or interests of individual students). 
175 Bauries, supra note 142, at 952–53 (“[B]oth the evidence presented and the remedies the courts 
order focus on the state education system as a whole, rather than on any individual student rights-
holders.”). 
176 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 333, 723–24 (2000). 
177 Id. at 723. 
178 Id. at 726–37. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860–61 (N.Y. 1968) 
(emphasizing that the amount of protection the City provides is to be dictated by the availability of local 
resources, not courts).  
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Education clauses, however, stand in stark contrast to these other 
public service duties. Today’s legislatures and local districts are not 
voluntarily providing education or bestowing gratuitous benefits on 
individuals. Education is part of the constitutional compact between 
citizens and the government.179 The point of that compact is to obligate the 
state to provide education regardless of the burden it imposes on the 
state.180 Likewise, education clauses are not mere job descriptions or grants 
of power, like those granted to Congress and the President in the federal 
Constitution.181 In many states, they are specific directives to achieve 
particular results for the benefit of citizens.182 
 
179 In fact, this new education compact was for Southern states a condition of readmission to the 
Union following the Civil War. See generally ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 90 (2009) (“A central feature of Radical Reconstruction was to require . . . the southern 
states to revise their constitutions . . . as a condition of readmission to the Union.” (emphasis in 
original)); John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State 
Constitutional Provisions for Education 1776–1900, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 26–27 (1998) 
(describing various developments in Confederate state constitutions following the Civil War). The 
legislatures that passed these new education amendments were heavily populated by former slaves who 
wanted to ensure access to education that would help guarantee their place as citizens. See James 
Lowell Underwood, African American Founding Fathers, in AT FREEDOM’S DOOR: AFRICAN 
AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAROLINA 13–15 (James 
Lowell Underwood & W. Lewis Burke Jr. eds., 2000). State supreme courts, after reviewing the 
legislative history of their education clauses, often emphasize that the clause’s purpose is to equip 
students for citizenship and ensure the continuance of democracy and self-government. See, e.g., Conn. 
Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 227 (Conn. 2010) (“[T]he state 
constitution embodies a substantive component requiring that the public schools provide their students 
with an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate 
fully in democratic institutions, such as jury service and voting, and to prepare them to progress to 
institutions of higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise to contribute to the 
state’s economy.”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass. 1993) 
(“[T]his duty is designed not only to serve the interests of the children, but, more fundamentally, to 
prepare them to participate as free citizens of a free State to meet the needs and interests of a republican 
government, namely the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.”); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 397 (Vt. 
1997) (“To keep a democracy competitive and thriving, students must be afforded equal access to all 
that our educational system has to offer. In the funding of what our Constitution places at the core of a 
successful democracy, the children of Vermont are entitled to a reasonably equal share.”). 
180 In the South, of course, there was significant opposition to the provision of education, 
particularly to African-Americans. The new education clauses broke that resistance. Underwood, supra 
note 179, at 14–15; see also INST. FOR EDUC. EQUITY & OPPORTUNITY, EDUCATION IN THE 50 STATES: 
A DESKBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS ABOUT EDUCATION (2008) 
(detailing the history of each education clause). 
181 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . .”); id. art. 2, § 1 (“[The 
president shall] faithfully execute the Office [and] preserve, protect and defend the Constitution. . . .”). 
182 See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII (stating that the purpose of education clause is 
“preservation of a free government; and spreading the opportunities and advantages of education 
through the various parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty 
of the [state] . . . [to] promot[e] . . . agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and 
natural history of the country”); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 395–96 (Tex. 
1989) (“Other delegates recognized the importance of a diffusion of knowledge among the masses not 
only for the preservation of democracy, but for the prevention of crime and for the growth of the 
economy.”).  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
34 
Regardless, school discipline cases do not even acknowledge these 
underlying issues. Some simply assume a constitutional right to education 
exists while others conclude it does not exist for the purposes of school 
exclusion simply because school finance precedent does not explicitly 
declare such a right.183 The latter assumption is incorrect. At worst, school 
finance precedent, on the whole, neither affirms nor rejects an individual 
constitutional right.184 In other words, the question of whether students have 
an individual personal right to education may be an open question in 
precedent, but it is not foreclosed. 
The discipline cases skip over the duty–rights distinction and the 
questions involved in finding an individual personal right in education by 
pointing to school finance opinions that speak of a “fundamental” right or 
interest in education or a “constitutional right” to an adequate education.185 
For the purpose of individual personal rights creation, however, these 
phrases are mere tautology. If the phrasing matters at all, it is only relevant 
to the type of scrutiny a court might presumptively apply.186 But all of these 
courts apply some level of aggressive or heightened review and are 
functionally equivalent in the remedies they impose, all of which are aimed 
at the system of education, not individual rights. For that matter, a number 
of courts do not speak of rights at all, but only of states’ constitutional 
duties in education. Yet, beyond that phraseology, the cases are practically 
indistinguishable.187 
To be clear, these references to rights and constitutional duties are 
highly suggestive of an individual personal right to education. But they are 
not definitive because the issue of individual personal rights was never 
 
183 See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass. 1995). 
184 See Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915, 937 (2016) 
(questioning the conclusion that a right to education does not exist simply because it has not been 
enforced by an injunctive remedy).  
185 See, e.g., Bitner, supra note 20, at 778 (focusing on whether states had declared education a 
fundamental right). 
186 Fundamental rights presumptively trigger strict scrutiny. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 691. 
With the constitutional right to education, some courts apply strict scrutiny, while others apply some 
unnamed form of rigorous scrutiny. These latter courts appear to apply automatic liability as to the 
violation and deference as to remedy. See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 349 (N.Y. 2003) (holding the 
state strictly accountable for deprivation of sound basic education); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. 
Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 495 (Ark. 2002), mandate recalled by 142 S.W.3d 643 (Ark. 2004) (“[W]e 
conclude that the clear language of Article 14 imposes upon the State an absolute constitutional duty to 
educate our children . . . .”); CFE III, 861 N.E.2d 50, 52 (N.Y. 2006) (deferring on funding remedy). 
For purposes of rights creation, however, it does not matter whether the right is fundamental or 
constitutional or, for that matter, not labeled a right at all. What matters is whether a court enforced the 
education clause as though a right exists. 
187 See generally Weishart, supra note 184 (finding that, regardless of whether the underlying legal 
theory was based on a duty or a right, the evidence establishing liability and the remedies enforced in 
school finance litigation tend to be the same across cases).  
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squarely before the courts.188 The central issue in school finance litigation, 
whether articulated in terms of duties or rights, was the enforceability of 
the state’s obligation to establish and support an equal or quality education 
system.189 Thus, pronouncements about rights in school finance cases 
occurred within a framework primarily focused on the state’s duty to the 
public, not to individuals. 
School finance courts come closest to meaningfully discussing 
individual rights when determining whether an individual can enforce the 
state’s education duties against the state.190 This issue, however, is more 
akin to a standing question than an individual rights question. In other 
words, because school finance cases do not turn on the existence of 
individual personal rights, almost no school finance precedent bothers to 
distinguish between state duties and individual personal rights. For that 
reason, the very few courts that afford the question of individual personal 
rights any significance offer only oblique insights. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, for instance, specifically 
emphasized that “[t]he right to an adequate education mandated by the 
constitution is not based on the exclusive needs of a particular individual, 
but rather is a right held by the public to enforce the State’s duty.”191 The 
court followed with the arguably contradictory statement that “[a]ny citizen 
has standing to enforce this right.”192 The Arkansas Supreme Court took a 
different tact, indicating that a state “constitution’s specific charge to [the] 
legislature to provide education is sufficient to afford fundamental-right 
status to beneficiaries of that duty,”193 but that it would refrain from 
deciding the issue to avoid triggering strict scrutiny.194 Instead, it simply 
held that the constitution “imposes upon the State an absolute constitutional 
 
188 Weishart persuasively argues that past school finance cases are best measured by their 
functional holdings rather than their precise rights terminology. Id. at 921. Under a functional approach, 
a much larger number of education clauses may create rights. See id. at 922. Under this reasoning, the 
discipline decision in Doe v. Superintendent of School, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass. 1995), for 
instance, would have incorrectly inferred the absence of a right because the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts had previously enforced a state duty to provide a sufficient education in McDuffy v. 
Secretary of Executive Office of Education, 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993).  
189 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 204 (Ky. 1989); Leandro v. 
State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 257 (N.C. 1997). 
190 Bauries, supra note 142, at 978–79 (“[T]he ‘right to education’ in these states seems to be 
nothing more than the standing of an individual to assert a generalized grievance concerning the 
systemic adequacy of the state education system.”). 
191 Claremont I, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993). 
192 Id. (citing Fogg v. Bd. of Educ., 82 A. 173 (N.H. 1912)).  
193 Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 493 (Ark. 2002), mandate recalled 
by 142 S.W.3d 643 (Ark. 2004) (citing Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997)). 
194 Id. at 495. 
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duty to educate our children.”195 In short, Arkansas and New Hampshire’s 
individual rights analyses were indefinite because they were not central to 
the issues before the courts. On the issues actually before the courts, they 
were clear: their states have an education duty that is privately 
enforceable.196 
The Washington Supreme Court offered the most direct discussion of 
whether there is an individual personal right that bears relevance beyond 
structural duties. In Seattle School District No. 1 v. State,197 the court 
compared the right to education to the rights found in a bill of rights.198 It 
would be “illogical [to conclude] that a mandatory constitutional provision 
placing an affirmative ‘paramount duty’ on the State to ‘make ample 
provision for the education’ of a specific class of citizens is not judicially 
enforceable,” while the constitution’s other affirmatively stated rights are 
judicially enforceable.199 Thus, like other rights enumerated in the 
constitution, the court concluded that education is a “constitutional 
guarantee[] of a personal nature.”200 Yet, one could still query whether 
Seattle School District conclusively resolved the question of individual 
personal rights because, like other cases, it only involved the enforcement 
of the state’s systemic education duty.201 In this respect, the difference 
between the precise holdings in Washington and other states is minimal at 
best, notwithstanding the seemingly positive language in Seattle School 
District and the seemingly negative language in cases like New 
Hampshire’s.202 
In short, school finance precedent, on the whole, does not ascribe 
significance to the question of duties versus individual personal rights. In 
those few instances when a court seems to raise the issue, the resulting 
analysis does not directly answer the questions most pertinent to discipline. 
The fairest reading of school finance precedent may simply be that the 
scope of any individual right to education is not clearly defined, while state 
 
195 Id. 
196 Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1376 (“We hold that part II, article 83 imposes a duty on the State to 
provide a constitutionally adequate education to every educable child.”); Lake View, 91 S.W.3d at 495 
(“[W]e conclude that the clear language of Article 14 imposes upon the State an absolute constitutional 
duty to educate our children . . . .”). 
197 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). 
198 Id. at 86–87. 
199 Id. (citation omitted). 
200 Id. at 87. 
201 Id. at 84–87 (framing the issue as whether the education clause “is a mere preamble, or policy 
declaration, which imposes no judicially enforceable affirmative duty upon either the legislative or 
executive branches of government”). 
202 See generally Weishart, supra note 184 (arguing that the education enforcement function is 
most important). 
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duties are. To the extent a court insists that an important distinction 
between duties and rights matter in discipline, the court must resolve the 
question itself, looking to precedent for guidance but not answers. In 
looking to those past courts for guidance, the most important thing is what 
those courts have done, not the tautology of what they have said.203 What 
they have done is apply their state constitutional clauses in ways that force 
the state to provide improved educational opportunity for students.204 
5. Students Do Not Forfeit Their Rights.—Two courts explicitly 
rejected students’ discipline claims on the premise that the students had 
forfeited any right to education they might have.205 Two others referenced 
forfeiture as a basis for lowering the scrutiny in discipline or sanctioning a 
temporary withdrawal of education services.206 Another left open the 
possibility of forfeiture.207 These statements and holdings are based on little 
more than intuition and rhetoric. Doctrine and logic do not support the 
conclusions. 
As a general principle, individuals retain their constitutional rights, 
notwithstanding their conduct. Incarcerated criminals, for instance, retain 
their rights so long as they are not inconsistent with the conditions of their 
confinement.208 The U.S. Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that a 
criminal defendant does not give up the right to confront witnesses against 
 
203 Id. at 961. 
204 See generally Rebell, supra note 21, at 1468, 1470 (cataloguing the judicial outcomes in favor 
of requiring the state to improve educational opportunities and resources for students); Weishart, supra 
note 184, at 936. 
205 Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1096 (Mass. 1995); Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. 
Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807, 814–15 (Neb. 1997).   
206 King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 263 (N.C. 2010) 
(writing “Leandro does not immunize students from the consequences of their own misconduct” and a 
state may “temporarily remov[e] students who engage in misconduct that disrupts the sound basic 
education of their peers”); In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 874–75 (Wyo. 2004) (“[T]he fundamental right to 
an opportunity for an education does not guarantee that a student cannot temporarily forfeit educational 
services through his own conduct. Educational services are provided with reasonable conditions 
because the Wyoming constitution requires that all students receive an equal opportunity to a quality 
education.”). 
207 Compare Keith D. v. Ball, 350 S.E.2d 720, 722–23 (W. Va. 1986) (“The students in this case 
have temporarily forfeited their right to education.”), with Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 914 (W. Va. 1996) (applying strict scrutiny, but indicating it was modifying 
Keith only to the extent Keith’s holding was inconsistent with the court’s new opinion). 
208 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (“[P]risons are not beyond the reach of 
the Constitution. . . . Indeed, we have insisted that prisoners be accorded those rights not fundamentally 
inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration.”); Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (stating prisoners “retain[] those First Amendment rights that are 
not inconsistent with” prison). Interestingly, states do strip many felons of the right to vote, which the 
Court thus far has sanctioned. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974). The Fourteenth 
Amendment, however, includes a specific textual basis for this holding. Id. at 41–42. 
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him, even when he has acted violently toward those witnesses.209 In 
addition, while the Constitution does not impose any general duty on the 
state to protect or provide for the welfare of citizens, during confinement, 
the state becomes obligated to feed, clothe, house, and protect prisoners 
from certain harms.210 
The notion that criminals firmly retain their rights but misbehaving 
students do not is difficult to justify. Moreover, federal courts have 
specifically indicated that misbehaving students are in no way equivalent to 
criminals and retain their federal constitutional rights.211 Thus, the idea in 
discipline cases that students forfeit state constitutional rights may have 
some rhetorical appeal, but the idea lacks any grounding in logic or law.212 
Some courts have therefore simply inappropriately resorted to this 
forfeiture theory as a means to avoid the key question of whether students 
have an individually enforceable right to education. 
6. The Irrelevance of Alternative Schools.—Nearly all the discipline 
cases relying on school finance precedent thus far have been challenges to 
the failure to provide alternative education.213 Litigating the constitutional 
right to education through alternative schools is fundamentally problematic 
for doctrinal and practical reasons. In terms of doctrine, litigating access to 
alternative school ignores the central question of importance: schools’ 
authority to exclude students in general. Exclusion from school altogether 
unquestionably triggers procedural due process, which under the Supreme 
Court’s seminal decision in Goss v. Lopez requires that students receive 
notice of the evidence against them and a chance to respond. Given that 
Goss was decided based on an underlying statutory right, additional 
procedural protections might be required when the underlying right at stake 
is a constitutional right to education. But the focus on alternative schools 
alters the issues. Litigants, in effect, concede that districts can remove 
 
209 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008) (no forfeiture so long as defendant’s intent was 
not to deprive the court of access to witnesses). 
210 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” (quoting Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976), reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977)). 
211 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338–39 (1985); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1968) (holding that public schools cannot be “enclaves of 
totalitarianism”). 
212 See Bitner, supra note 20, at 794–95 (“School districts’ conceptualization of student 
misbehavior as forfeiture is misleading, however. Due to the unique characteristics that children 
possess, students are not capable of intentionally relinquishing their rights under an implied consent or 
social contract theory.”). 
213 See Amy P. Meek, School Discipline “As Part of the Teaching Process”: Alternative and 
Compensatory Education Required by the State’s Interest in Keeping Children in School, 28 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 155, 180 (2009) (discussing the challenges seeking access to alternative education). 
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students from regular school and seek only to gain access to education 
through an alternative school. Likewise, when a court orders a district to 
provide alternative education, the court creates its own basis for avoiding 
the central constitutional issues.214 
First, schools can argue that due process is not triggered when 
students have access to alternative school, asserting that expulsion is 
actually only a transfer.215 Second, by framing the issue as access to 
alternative education, courts moot the constitutional question of the state’s 
authority to deprive students of education. When courts require the state to 
provide education—albeit alternative education—they create the basis for 
the state to argue that students have not actually been deprived of the right 
to education. To show a deprivation of education, plaintiffs would need to 
show that the alternative school is qualitatively inferior to regular schools 
or that the alternative school falls below the constitutional threshold for an 
adequate or equal education.216 This showing, if equivalent to that in school 
finance litigation, would place an impracticable burden of proof on 
individual students.217 
 
214 See, e.g., In re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 115–17 (Miss. 1996) (“[Alternative school] legislation 
offers this Court an attractive alternative to avoid delving into school discipline cases on a constitutional 
level.”); King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 261 (N.C. 2010) 
(“In acknowledging a statutory right to alternative education, we stress that a fundamental right to 
alternative education does not exist under the state constitution.”) (applying intermediate scrutiny).  
215 See, e.g., Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(reasoning due process did not apply because student “was only to be transferred from one school 
program to another program with stricter discipline”); Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1359 
(6th Cir. 1996) (indicating due process is not triggered “absent some showing that the education 
received at the alternative school is significantly different from or inferior to that received at his regular 
public school” (first citing C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 389 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996); and then citing Doe 
v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 576 (10th Cir. 1994))); Scott B. v. Bd. of Trs. of Orange Cty. High Sch. of the 
Arts, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (holding student removed from charter school not 
entitled to due process because he could seek enrollment in a regular school). To be clear, however, 
these courts’ reasoning is flawed. The reputational injury of assignment to alternative school alone 
should be sufficient to trigger due process. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975). But see Paul 
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (restricting reputation-based due process claims and reasoning that 
Goss was premised on the intersection of liberty and property). Moreover, even without a showing of 
inferiority, students’ education property rights are sufficiently infringed to trigger constitutional 
protection. See Maureen Carroll, Racialized Assumptions and Constitutional Harm: Claims of Injury 
Based on Public School Assignment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 903 (2011). 
216 This issue has come up most often with procedural due process, where courts have required 
some qualitative showing prior to entertaining a due process claim. See, e.g., Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 
1359; Doe v. Todd Cty. Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 5069367, at *5 (D.S.D. Nov. 24, 2008); Chyma v. Tama 
Cty. Sch. Bd., 2008 WL 4552942, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 8, 2008) (“It appears to be the consensus of the 
circuits, however, that placement in an alternative school does not implicate procedural due process 
rights unless there is a showing that the education provided by the alternative school is substantially 
inferior.”). But see Carroll, supra note 215, at 913–14 (reasoning that this negative due process decision 
is not the consensus). 
217 See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 261 (N.C. 1997) (“Only such a clear showing [that 
students have not received an adequate education] will justify a judicial intrusion into an area so clearly 
the province, initially at least, of the legislative and executive branches. . . .”).  
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In addition to these doctrinal problems, focusing on access to 
alternative schools is also problematic as a practical matter. While high-
quality alternative schools may be a viable option for some subset of at-risk 
students,218 they are not general educational tools. First, they are not 
designed for the regular student who is otherwise succeeding in school but 
has been suspended or expelled for minor misbehavior.219 These students 
lose the academic rigor of regular school and may gain nothing from the 
unique services of alternative school. Second, it is far from clear that 
alternative schools even work for the students who might actually need 
them. The most obvious problem is that many offer the lowest quality 
education imaginable; they are more akin to warehouses than locations of 
learning.220 
Under such circumstances, litigants are fighting a battle that may not 
be worth fighting. What students really need is the right to remain in 
regular school. Focusing on the right to remain in regular school could 
force the state to offer a sufficient interest to exclude students. The cases, 
however, do not pose that challenge and are thereby reduced to fighting for 
a poor substitute to the constitutional right to education. Moreover, the 
existence of that substitute has become the basis by which to moot the key 
constitutional issues. 
 
218 Abbott IV, 710 A.2d 450, 532 (N.J. 1998) (explaining how they can offer personalized 
education for at-risk students who need it). 
219 Id. (describing the model alternative school as one for students with “learning, behavior, and 
family problems and need [for] a supportive learning environment”). 
220 Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 915 (W. Va. 1996) (“[T]he 
lack of resources is a major problem for some alternative education . . . .”); C.A. Lehr & C.M. Lange, 
Alternative Schools and the Students They Serve: Perceptions of State Directors of Special Education, 
14 POL’Y RES. BRIEF, Jan. 2003, at 6 tbl.2, https://ici.umn.edu/products/prb/141/ 
[https://perma.cc/9V26-ECBU] (identifying insufficient “funds to provide for quality facilities and 
instructional resources,” budget cuts, staffing certification, and accountability as issues in alternative 
schools); BRIAN KLEINER ET AL., NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PUBLIC ALTERNATIVE 
SCHOOLS AND PROGRAMS FOR STUDENTS AT RISK OF EDUCATION FAILURE: 2000-01, STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS REPORT iv (2002) (finding that one-third of the districts had alternative schools that were at 
capacity and could not accept more students and finding that more than half had been in that situation in 
last three years); CHERYL M. LANGE & SANDRA J. SLETTEN, ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION: A BRIEF 
HISTORY AND RESEARCH SYNTHESIS 17–18 (2002) (summarizing several studies finding negative 
educational outcomes in alternative schools and indicating that the evidence on improved outcomes is 
mixed at best); ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO 
JAILHOUSE TRACK 36 (2005) (describing Chicago’s alternative schools as warehouses for the students 
the district hopes will drop out); ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE 
DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 14 (2000), 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/school-discipline/opportunities-suspended-
the-devastating-consequences-of-zero-tolerance-and-school-discipline-policies/crp-opportunities-
suspended-zero-tolerance-2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/534A-84PP] (describing schools with a heavy 
police presence that lump grade levels together, run a shorter school day, and fail to provide 
instruction). 
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C. Framing an Individual Personal Right to Education  
that Limits School Exclusion 
Courts and litigants must avoid the distractions of alternative school, 
notions of forfeiture, and extreme outliers in student behavior. They should 
focus on everyday minor misbehavior and whether schools can remove 
students for that minor misbehavior. The answer to that question rests first 
and foremost on whether students have an individual right to education 
grounded in the state constitution. If so, the state will struggle to justify 
harsh disciplinary approaches to these students because they do not pose 
serious risks to safety or the learning environment and other strategies other 
than exclusion are readily available for dealing with these students. If 
students do not have an individual state constitutional right to education, 
the state can largely discipline students as it sees fit (save those arguments 
articulated in Part III). 
Whether students have a constitutionally-based right to education that 
limits school discipline could be framed in one of two ways. The first 
would ask whether students have a constitutional right or interest in 
education that school exclusion infringes. The other would ask whether any 
such education interest is a personal right or just the benefit that flows from 
the state carrying out its constitutional duties in education. The first 
framing is the simplest and easily points to recognizing a right to education. 
All state constitutions include an affirmative duty to provide 
education.221 If negative constitutional rights are enforceable as individual 
rights (i.e., to be free of unreasonable searches),222 the conclusion that an 
affirmative constitutional duty does not create an individual right is 
tenuous. An individual right is the logical corollary of an enforceable 
constitutional duty,223 even if a right is not explicitly stated. Consistent with 
that notion, most courts appear to assume or imply an individual right to 
education in school finance cases.224 Others specifically use the language of 
 
221 See supra note 21. 
222 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985). 
223 See, e.g., McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 247–48 (Wash. 2012) (“Flowing from this 
constitutionally imposed ‘duty’ is its jural correlative, a correspondent ‘right’ permitting control of 
another’s conduct. Therefore, all children residing within the borders of the State possess a ‘right,’ 
arising from the constitutionally imposed ‘duty’ of the State, to have the State make ample provision for 
their education.” (citations omitted)). 
224 See, e.g., Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (never declaring a 
right, but holding that the “education clause requires the General Assembly to provide the opportunity 
for each child to receive a minimally adequate education”); CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 349 (N.Y. 2003) 
(indicating the court’s task of enforcing the constitution “began with Levittown’s articulation of the 
constitutional right to a sound basic education—not at all a ‘catchphrase for an inferred constitutional 
guarantee,’ but this Court’s careful judgment 21 years ago as to what is meant by our State 
Constitution’s promise in the Education Article”). 
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fundamental rights, even if creating discipline rights was not their intent.225 
Sixteen states in total specifically declare education a fundamental right or 
interest in school finance cases.226 Another large group of states reference a 
constitutional duty to deliver education, which again should logically 
dictate a right.227 While these constitutional and judicial references and 
assumptions may not definitively create an individual constitutional right, 
they at the very least create a strong presumption that a right exists. To 
conclude a right does not exist, a state should be required to offer a specific 
and powerful rationale that, thus far, is entirely missing. After all, it is the 
state that is asking that it be exempted from providing education to certain 
students. 
The second framing—personal right versus public duty—is arguably 
subterfuge to disengage from enforcing education clauses. As noted in 
Section II.B.2, a duty–rights distinction is a relatively unique concept. 
While it may make sense in some contexts, its fit is strained in education, 
particularly in the withdrawal of education. First, the affirmative education 
obligations in state constitutions and the refusal to carry out that duty in 
regard to some students is entirely distinct from the voluntary provision of 
other government services.228 Second, while many school finance cases 
 
225 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 
374 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989); Robinson v. 
Cahill, 351 A.2d 713, 720 (N.J. 1975); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255–56 (N.C. 1997); 
Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 
384, 391–95 (Vt. 1997); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. 
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980). 
226 Bitner, supra note 20, at 766 (citing Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973); 
Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1244; Horton, 376 A.2d at 374; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 206; Skeen v. State, 
505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993); Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240 
(Miss. 1985); Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1358–59 (N.H. 1997); Robinson, 351 A.2d at 720; 
Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255–56; Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 511 N.W.2d at 256; Sch. Dist. of 
Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995); Scott v. Commonwealth, 
443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994); Brigham, 692 A.2d at 391–95; Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340, 346 (W. Va. 1997); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989); 
Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 606 P.2d at 333. 
227 See, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 526 (Mass. 1993) 
(explaining the “duty to ‘cherish’ public schools as a duty to ensure that the public schools achieve their 
object and educate the people”); Claremont I, 635 A.2d 1375, 1378 (N.H. 1993) (writing that the “terms 
‘shall be the duty . . . to cherish’ in our constitution . . . command[], in no uncertain terms, that the State 
provide an education to all its citizens and that it support all public schools”); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist., 
515 S.E.2d at 541 (“[T]he constitutional duty to ensure the provision of a minimally adequate education 
to each student in South Carolina rests on the legislative branch of government.”). It is worth 
recognizing that scholars disagree as to whether such a duty creates rights. Compare Scott R. Bauries, 
The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 718–40 (2012) (questiong whether an education 
duty creates rights), with Weishart, supra note 184, at 920 (disagreeing with Bauries). 
228 See generally Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of 
Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459 (2010) (analyzing positive 
and negative constitutional guarantees and how state courts should interpret and apply education 
clauses). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting that while education may not be a 
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have analyzed the state’s “education duty” without referencing rights, the 
point has not been to contrast a duty to a right. Rather, the point has been to 
determine whether the state has an education duty at all and whether courts 
can qualitatively assess the manner in which the state discharges that 
duty.229 Courts may have disagreed on their capacity to enforce or second-
guess this duty, but no serious disagreement exists as to whether the state 
has a duty. The explicit language in education clauses clearly indicate they 
have a duty and, if they refused to discharge this duty completely, one 
could reasonably predict that even more courts would second-guess the 
state at that point.230 
Third, the claim in discipline cases is not that the state is somehow 
doing a poor job of providing education to suspended and expelled 
students. Rather, the claim is that a state cannot take education away 
without a good reason and, even when it has a good reason, the state must 
be careful.231 Plaintiffs are not asking courts to second-guess how the state 
carries out its duty. Instead, plaintiffs would be challenging the state’s 
refusal to carry out its duty by excluding students under unnecessary 
circumstances.232 The contrary notion that the state only has a duty to 
educate those students whom it wants to educate is a hard one to fathom. 
In sum, precedent, logic, and constitutional clauses all point to the 
conclusion that students have an individual right to education. Where 
courts have glossed over a specific individual personal right in education, it 
may simply be because there is no reason to doubt that such a right exists. 
Those courts focusing on education duties have done so primarily as a 
strategy for removing themselves from the separation of powers struggles 
 
fundamental right under the federal Constitution, neither is it “merely some governmental ‘benefit’ 
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation”). 
229 See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 495 (Ark. 2002) 
(“[B]ecause we conclude that the clear language of Article 14 imposes upon the State an absolute 
constitutional duty to educate our children, we conclude that it is unnecessary to reach the issue of 
whether a fundamental right is also implied.”). 
230 Even the U.S. Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
indicated that a different question would have been presented had plaintiffs demonstrated that the state 
was failing to provide the most minimal level of education. 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973) (conceding that 
“some identifiable quantum of education is . . . constitutionally protected”). See also Papasan v. Allain, 
478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (“[T]his Court has not yet definitively settled . . . whether a minimally 
adequate education is a fundamental right.”). 
231 See, e.g., King ex. rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 265 (N.C. 
2010) (“We believe considerations of fairness, institutional transparency, and public trust are generally 
best effectuated when government provides a reason for its denial of services.”); Phillip Leon M. v. 
Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 914–16 (W. Va. 1996). 
232 See, e.g., Phillip Leon, 484 S.E.2d at 912 (explaining that because the Board of Education “did 
not have a duty to provide an education to an expelled student . . . and . . . that by his acts, a pupil can 
forfeit all rights to a state provided education, the heart of our opinion centers on the right of a 
misbehaving pupil to an education in West Virginia”). 
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involved in educational finances and quality,233 not to negate an individual 
interest or right in education. Given the different context, a duty–right 
distinction need not necessarily arise in discipline. The difficult question in 
discipline should not be whether a constitutional right exists, but whether 
the state has a sufficient justification and narrowly tailored method for 
withdrawing that right from students who do not pose a serious threat to 
safety or order. As demonstrated in Section II.B.2, the state lacks any clear, 
important, or compelling interest in excluding students for minor 
misbehavior. Even if it does, far less intrusive means are available to 
achieve the state’s interests, which narrowly tailoring would require. 
D. Countering Likely Objections 
The most likely objection to the foregoing individual rights claim 
would be that short-term suspensions, in and of themselves, do not amount 
to a deprivation substantial enough to trigger anything more than rational 
basis scrutiny. This objection might concede that an expulsion and denial 
of education services during expulsion might trigger strict scrutiny, but a 
short-term suspension only involves a temporary exclusion from school 
that can amount to less than one percent of the school year. As such, a 
suspension does not per se prevent a student from making regular academic 
progress and receiving quality educational opportunities. An analogous 
argument led the U.S. Supreme Court to require only minimal due process 
for short-term suspensions and a more formal process for expulsions and 
suspensions longer than ten days.234 If accurate, this argument would negate 
almost the entirety of the analysis in Part II, as expulsions comprise a very 
small percentage of school exclusions.235 
This argument overlooks two major points. First, the harm of a short-
term suspension extends well beyond the time that a student misses from 
school. A single suspension significantly depresses academic achievement 
for the remainder of the year and in subsequent years.236 Moreover, after a 
student is suspended once, his or her chances of subsequent suspension and 
 
233 See generally MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 
THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 22–29 (2009) (discussing separation of powers holdings). See, e.g., Coal. 
for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996); McDaniel 
v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167–68 (Ga. 1981). 
234 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). 
235 See, e.g., EDWARD J. SMITH & SHAUN R. HARPER, DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF K-12 
SCHOOL SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION ON BLACK STUDENTS IN SOUTHERN STATES 5 (2012) (finding 
that in Southern states “427,768 Black boys were suspended and 14,643 were expelled”). 
236 See, e.g., Edward W. Morris & Brea L. Perry, The Punishment Gap: School Suspension and 
Racial Disparities in Achievement, 63 SOC. PROBLEMS 68, 80–81 (2016); see also Section III.B.2. 
111:1 (2016) Reforming School Discipline 
45 
expulsion rise dramatically.237 In other words, all school exclusions, 
regardless of their length, are very serious occurrences in the academic life 
of a student. They cannot be minimized or distinguished simply by 
measuring them in terms of the amount of time a student misses from 
school. 
Second, the standard showing for triggering constitutional scrutiny is 
whether a plaintiff has suffered a substantial harm.238 If so, the requisite 
scrutiny applies. The scrutiny does not slide based on the extent of the 
harm. Thus, the question with suspensions would be whether they 
substantially impair the right to education, not whether they are as serious 
as an expulsion. The answer to the former is yes. Not only does a single 
suspension decrease achievement and increase the chance of subsequent 
suspension, studies show that the decrease is substantial—equivalent to 
decreases that courts have found sufficient to state a claim in adequacy and 
equity cases.239 
The other objection one might raise to the foregoing arguments is that 
schools jeopardize the learning of others and cannot maintain orderly 
learning environments if they allow disruptive students to remain in the 
classroom. Thus, schools have a compelling interest for suspending 
students and doing so is necessary to achieve that interest. Social science 
does not, however, support this seemingly common-sense objection either. 
Part III explores the literature on this point in detail. For now, it suffices to 
say that studies show that suspension is an ineffective tool for maintaining 
order in schools. First, suspensions do not improve the behavior of students 
once they return to school.240 Second, the decision to routinely suspend 
 
237 TONY FABELO ET AL., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 37–38 (2011), 
http://issuu.com/csgjustice/docs/breaking_schools_rules_report_final-1/1?e=2448066/1603396 
[https://perma.cc/PQF6-KE6V]; Linda M. Raffaele Mendez, Predictors of Suspension and Negative 
School Outcomes: A Longitudinal Investigation, 99 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUTH DEV. 7, 25, 29–30 
(2003); Tary Tobin et al., Patterns in Middle School Discipline Records, 4 J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. 
DISORDERS 82, 91 (1996). 
238 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 816–17 (outlining a prima facie fundamental 
rights claim). 
239 Compare ANDY WHISMAN & PATRICIA CAHAPE HAMMER, W. VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE 
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE: A CASE FOR POSITIVE 
DISCIPLINE APPROACHES, at v (2014) (explaining that suspended students are 2.4 times more likely to 
score below proficient), and Morris & Perry, supra note 236, at 80–81 (finding students suspended once 
actually regressed academically over the course of two years), with Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 
599 S.E.2d. 365, 382 (N.C. 2004) (examining student proficiency on tests to assess whether they had 
been deprived of an adequate education). See also infra Section III.B.3. 
240 Instead, suspension reinforces misbehavior and also simply makes it more likely that schools 
would impose suspension again for misbehavior. See, e.g., Mendez, supra note 237, at 29–30. Thus, the 
policy of suspending students for minor misbehavior is really just the first step in adopting discipline 
policies that will escalate, increasing punishment until students are funneled into the juvenile justice 
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students for minor misbehavior alters the overall learning climate241 and, 
thereby, depresses the academic achievement of well-behaved students,242 
whose education schools are purportedly acting to protect. In sum, while 
schools might assert an interest in maintaining school order, suspensions do 
not actually serve that interest. Moreover, asserting as much falsely pits 
misbehaving students against other students. Part III seeks to reframe the 
debate over school discipline and demonstrate that all students’ interests 
are aligned with discipline policies that rely far less heavily on suspensions 
and expulsions. 
III. EQUAL AND ADEQUATE EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES  
AS A FUNCTION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 
While courts should recognize students’ constitutional right to 
education and limit attempts by the state to withdraw that education, far 
more is at stake for the education system as a whole. Ineffective discipline 
harms everyone in school—from the misbehaving student to his peers to a 
school’s overall academic quality. These later problems, however, call for a 
different analysis than Part II. The effects of a school environment and 
disciplinary policies on the overall school and its academic outcomes raise 
systemic questions. These questions go to the same core disputes that have 
dominated school finance litigation for the past half-century. These 
disputes do not center on whether students have individual rights, but 
whether the state is carrying out its constitutional duty to provide equal and 
adequate education opportunities. 
As detailed in Section I.B, school finance precedent is built on several 
key principles. Both individually and collectively, these principles bring to 
the fore new and developing social science on the connection between 
discipline practices, school quality, and academic achievement. The state 
has the ultimate and final constitutional duty to ensure equal and adequate 
education opportunities. That duty extends beyond just money to nearly 
any educational policy or practice that deprives students of the educational 
opportunity their state constitution mandates. It also includes monitoring 
and supporting local districts to ensure students receive these opportunities. 
A number of demographic groups are particularly at risk of academic 
 
system. See generally BROWNE, supra note 12 (identifying and critiquing a discipline system that 
amounts to a schoolhouse-to-jailhouse track). 
241 See, e.g., RICHARD ARUM, JUDGING SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: THE CRISIS OF MORAL AUTHORITY 34 
(2003) (students perceive discipline as random and unfair when it is too strict); Perry & Morris, supra 
note 11, at 1083. 
242 Perry & Morris, supra note 11, at 1068. 
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failure and the state must devote particular attention and resources to 
ensure these students can overcome academic barriers.243 
New and developing social science lies at the core of these principles. 
Social science increasingly demonstrates that while student misbehavior is 
a function of individual choices that students make, individual student 
misbehavior is also a function of the school environment in which they 
learn and act.244 Quality schools and orderly environments consistently 
produce higher student achievement and less misbehavior.245 Low-quality 
schools with disorderly, hostile, and punitive environments produce lower 
student achievement and higher rates of suspension and expulsion.246 
Finally, because minority students disproportionately attend schools with 
problematic discipline policies, their academic outcomes are particularly 
depressed, which has the effect of widening achievement gaps.247 Thus, 
reforming these discipline policies is one of the keys to delivering the equal 
and adequate education that school finance precedent mandates. The 
following Sections lay out this social science in detail and, for the first 
time, situate it within school finance precedent. 
A. Social Science Connections Between  
Discipline and Student Achievement 
1. School Exclusion Depresses Academic Achievement.—Some of 
the connections between discipline and student achievement are relatively 
obvious. For instance, studies consistently show that the amount of time 
spent in school and the quality of instruction and learning during that time 
directly affect achievement.248 If students are in environments that interfere 
with their ability to focus on schoolwork, their academic achievement 
suffers.249 If they are not in any school environment at all because they have 
 
243 See, e.g., Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d at 388–89 (agreeing with the trial court “that 
neither the State nor . . . [the Hoke County School System] are strategically allocating the available 
resources to see that at-risk children have the equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education.”). 
244 Infra notes 276–85. 
245 Infra notes 248–75. 
246 Infra notes 248–75. 
247 Infra notes 286–310. 
248 See generally Jere Brophy, Research Linking Teacher Behavior to Student Achievement: 
Potential Implications for Instruction of Chapter 1 Students, 23 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 235 (1988) (“[T]he 
key to achievement gain by low-achieving students is maximizing the time that they spend being 
actively instructed or supervised by their teachers.”); Arthur J. Reynolds & Herbert J. Walberg, A 
Structural Model of Science Achievement, 83 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 97 (Mar. 1991) (“[I]nstructional time 
also proved instrumental in the achievement process by mediating the effects of other factors.”). 
249 INA V.S. MULLIS ET AL., TRENDS IN INT’L MATHEMATICS AND SCI. STUDIES, TIMSS 2011 
INTERNATIONAL RESULTS IN MATHEMATICS 263–64 (2012) (finding lower achievement in disorderly 
schools in an analysis of international math scores); Valerie E. Lee & Anthony S. Bryk, A Multilevel 
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been suspended or expelled, their academic achievement suffers.250 If 
students’ teachers are regularly pulled away from instruction to deal with 
discipline of one student, the academic achievement of other students 
suffers.251 Studies find that, even after accounting for demographic 
variables, standardized test scores closely track suspension rates. Thus, to 
no surprise, schools with the most suspensions have the lowest test 
scores.252 
Current research goes far beyond the simplistic notion that if 
misbehaving students are disrupting their classmates, their classmates learn 
less. If that were all the data revealed, schools might reasonably exclude 
the misbehaving student in the interest of preserving the educational 
environment for others. Nuanced studies indicate that a school’s approach 
to discipline and frequency of suspensions heavily influence student 
achievement.253 Even after controlling for race, poverty, and school type, 
suspension rates predict more than one-third of a school’s overall academic 
achievement.254 With all other things being equal, academic achievement is 
lower in schools with higher suspension rates.255 As one study put it, 
“serving a high percentage of poor minority children does not mean that a 
 
Model of the Social Distribution of High School Achievement, 62 SOC. OF EDUC. 172, 189 (1989) (“At a 
purely behavioral level, a minimum of disciplinary problems is a necessary condition for the routine 
pursuit of academic work.”). 
250 See, e.g., James Earl Davis & Will J. Jordan, The Effects of School Context, Structure, and 
Experiences on African American Males in Middle and High School, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 570, 581–83 
(1994); see also Terrance M. Scott & Susan B. Barrett, Using Staff and Student Time Engaged in 
Disciplinary Procedures to Evaluate the Impact of School-Wide PBS, 6 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. 
INTERVENTIONS 21, 24 (2004) (detailing the time schools spend on disciplinary matters that could 
otherwise be spent on instruction and learning). 
251 See generally Scott & Barrett, supra note 250, at 23 (discussing the amount of time teachers 
spend on disciplining students rather than instruction). 
252 RUSSELL J. SKIBA ET AL., CONSISTENT REMOVAL: CONTRIBUTIONS OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE TO 
THE SCHOOL-PRISON PIPELINE 29 (2003) (“[I]ncreased rates of school exclusion are correlated with 
lower achievement test scores.”); RAUSCH & SKIBA, supra note 8, at 9, 18–19 (reviewing studies that 
find, for instance, “that a school’s emphasis on discipline and the number of suspensions a student 
received negatively predicted achievement in mathematics, science, and history even when controlling 
for a number of other variables including socio-economic status”). 
253 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., ZERO TOLERANCE, supra note 220, at 12; Pamela Fenning & 
Jennifer Rose, Overrepresentation of African American Students in Exclusionary Discipline: The Role 
of School Policy, 42 URBAN EDUC. 536, 548 (2007) (finding that suspension and expulsion are related 
to school policies and factors not characteristics internal to students); Shi-Chang Wu et al., Student 
Suspension: A Critical Reappraisal, 14 URBAN REV. 245, 271–72 (1982); see also Gathogo Mukuria, 
Disciplinary Challenges: How Do Principals Address This Dilemma?, 37 URBAN EDUC. 432, 449 
(2002) (“[P]rincipals in schools with low suspension rates care and have concern for the students. These 
findings are consistent with the work of Lomotey (1991), who found that effective African American 
principals have sympathy and concern for their students.”). 
254 RAUSCH & SKIBA, supra note 8, at 16 (describing a suspension model that “includes socio-
demographic variables [and] accounted for a moderately high amount of the total school variation in 
achievement scores (Adjusted r2 = 53.2%), explaining an additional 36.1% of the total variation”). 
255 Id.  
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school will necessarily have a high suspension rate,”256 but having a high 
suspension rate does seem to mean that academic achievement, as 
measured by test scores, will decline.257 
These findings would appear to fly in the face of conventional wisdom 
that believes excluding misbehaving students ensures orderly learning 
environments for everyone else.258 The explanation lies in the fact that 
while schools must address and prevent misbehavior, how schools respond 
matters immensely. First, schools’ response to student misbehavior—not 
just the misbehavior itself—affects the learning environment.259 Suspending 
students on a regular basis negatively affects the general student body’s 
perception of school authority and the school’s climate.260 
Second, as discipline becomes overly strict or harsh, the general 
student body—including well-behaved students—begins to perceive school 
authorities as arbitrary and unfair.261 At that point, students may have any 
number of negative reactions, including resentment, opposition, fear, or 
disillusionment.262 Some students who previously had no behavioral 
problems begin to act out, and misbehavior among “bad” students becomes 
all the more frequent.263 Schools that persist in the idea that the problems 
with the school climate stem solely from misbehaving students, rather than 
the school’s discipline policies, can spiral into complete dysfunction.264 In 
 
256 Mendez et al., supra note 154, at 273 (emphasis removed). 
257 Id. at 261. 
258 See, e.g., Perry & Morris, supra note 11, at 1083 (“[T]he most common rationale for 
maintaining ‘tough’ exclusionary discipline policies . . . [is] that removing disruptive students creates a 
safe, orderly environment conducive to learning for students who conform to school rules.”). 
259 See generally ARUM, supra note 241; Fenning & Rose, supra note 253, at 538–39 (emphasizing 
schools’ ability to implement alternative discipline regimes that alter and improve school climate). 
260 See, e.g., ARUM, supra note 241 (noting that the harshness of discipline negatively affects how 
the overall student body perceives school climate and authority); see also Davis & Jordan, supra note 
250, at 26 (discussing the possible linkage between school climate and student achievement). 
261 ARUM, supra note 241, at 156. 
262 Id. at 182 (stating that students who perceived school discipline as unfair “had a 35 percent 
likelihood of expressing a willingness to disobey rules” compared to 5% when discipline was perceived 
as fair). 
263 See generally ARUM, supra note 241, at 155–57, 181–82 (discussing an overall increase in 
students’ perception of disciplinary unfairness as discipline becomes more strict, as well as increased 
willingness to disregard school rules); Mendez, supra note 237 (finding suspension is a predictor of 
later misbehavior). 
264 Out of control dysfunction helps explain why some schools in Washington, D.C. and New 
Orleans have suspension rates as high as 50% and 75%, meaning that in a school with 400 students, the 
schools will impose 200 to 300 suspensions in a single year. See EVERY STUDENT EVERY DAY COAL., 
supra note 4, at 4 tbl.2 (indicating that the three highest suspending middle schools in the District of 
Columbia public school system have suspension rates of 67% to 72%); Kari Harden, Civil Rights 
Complaints Are Filed Against Three N.O. Schools, LOUISIANA WEEKLY (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://www.louisianaweekly.com/civil-rights-complaints-are-filed-against-three-n-o-schools/ 
[https://perma.cc/EG5L-KMQH] (discussing a civil rights complaint against a charter school with a 
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short, schools cannot simply suspend their way out of discipline 
problems.265 
Third, negative climates seemingly combine with escalating student 
misbehavior to drive down the academic achievement of “innocent 
bystanders.”266 New studies focus on how innocent bystanders suffer the 
“collateral consequences” of harsh discipline policies.267 Tracking student 
suspensions and math achievement across years, researchers find that high 
levels of exclusionary discipline negatively affect the academic 
achievement of nonsuspended students.268 The effect is strongest in schools 
with low levels of violence and high levels of exclusionary discipline.269 
Finally, environmental climates and student achievement also have 
reciprocal effects on students’ access to the most vital educational resource: 
quality teachers.270 Teachers in negative environments are more likely to be 
absent from school, transfer schools, or quit teaching altogether.271 The 
result is a further lowering of instructional and teacher quality in these 
schools.272 The lowering of the quality of teaching further depresses a 
 
68% suspension rate). These schools do not have the worst students in the nation; they have the worst 
school climates. 
265 See generally Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 20, at 81. If zero tolerance policies eliminated 
troublemakers, “the initial jump in zero tolerance removals would fall off as troublemakers were 
expelled. Instead, schools are expelling and suspending ever larger numbers of students.” Id. 
266 See Perry & Morris, supra note 11, at 1067 (finding that the academic achievement of students 
who are not suspended goes down when suspension rates are high). 
267 These consequences are analogous to those that flow from the mass incarceration in certain 
adult communities. Id. 
268 Id. at 1077 (explaining that in schools with above average suspension rates “we see an adverse 
effect of school suspension [on non-suspended students] that becomes especially pronounced at greater-
than-one standard deviation above the mean (i.e., the top one-third of schools) . . . [while] [i]n schools 
with low levels of violence (one standard deviation below the mean), the negative effect of out-of-
school suspension is very strong at high levels of suspension”). 
269 Id.  
270 Dan Goldhaber & Emily Anthony, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement, 115 ERIC 
CLEARINGHOUSE ON URBAN EDUC. 1 (2003) (sharing research that shows “teacher quality is the most 
important educational input predicting student achievement”); Megan Hopkins, A Vision for the Future: 
Collective Effort for Systemic Change, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 737, 737 (2008) (finding that quality of 
the teacher is the most important factor in student development, especially for low-income students of 
color). 
271 See Geoffrey D. Borman & N. Maritza Dowling, Teacher Attrition and Retention: A Meta-
Analytic and Narrative Review of the Research, 78 REV. OF EDUC. RESEARCH 367, 397 (2008) (finding 
school environment and conditions to be a significant explanation of teacher turnover). This matters 
because teacher attendance and retention directly affect student performance. Davis & Jordan, supra 
note 250, at 581 (“[T]eacher absences had the strongest association with Black male achievement.”). 
272 See, e.g., LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S 
COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 93, 118, 208, 314 (2010) (discussing the 
disincentive to teach students who are challenging to teach, how achievement variations across districts 
correlate with access to quality teachers, how teacher perceptions of students interfere with constructive 
interactions, and the connection between attrition and teacher quality). 
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school’s academic achievement,273 which makes it more difficult to attract 
quality teachers.274 In short, once climate, discipline, achievement, and 
teacher quality begin to interact negatively, a vicious cycle can form, from 
which it is hard to escape.275 
2. Schools’ Approach to Discipline Matters.—The primary lessons 
of the foregoing research are that schools have a choice in how they 
approach discipline and that choice matters for student behavior and 
student achievement. While some level of student misbehavior is a given, 
how educators respond is a choice.276 Schools are not passive participants in 
suspensions and expulsions, simply reacting to the unfortunate environment 
and circumstances they face.277 Rather, schools themselves are also 
responsible for student misbehavior and the number of suspensions they 
impose.278 As one researcher concluded after analyzing the data, students 
“interested in reducing their chances of being suspended . . . [would] be 
better off by transferring to a school with a lower suspension rate rather 
than by improving their attitudes or reducing their misbehavior.”279 
 
273 See, e.g., Davis & Jordan, supra note 250, at 584–85 (finding that students achieved the lowest 
in classrooms where teachers assigned the least work and had the lowest expectations and these factors 
interacted with the overall disciplinary environment); Xin Ma & J. Douglas Willms, School 
Disciplinary Climate: Characteristics and Effects on Eighth Grade Achievement, 50 ALBERTA J. EDUC. 
RES. 169, 180–82 (2004) (finding that students’ perceptions of their school’s disciplinary climate were 
significantly correlated to student achievement across subjects). 
274 As one study demonstrated, teachers prefer to work in predominantly white and middle-income 
schools. Eric A. Hanushek et al., Why Public Schools Lose Teachers, 39 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 326, 
337 (2004). But the effect of this preference can be to further depress needy students’ access to quality 
teachers, which reinforces the achievement gap. See generally HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK, 
EDUC. TRUST, TEACHING INEQUALITY: HOW POOR AND MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED ON 
TEACHER QUALITY 11 (2006), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED494820.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8XN-
86AB] (examining unequal access to quality teachers and its effect on educational opportunity). 
275 Findings and Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement, Reed v. State, No. BC432420, at 
28–29, 2011 WL 10893745, at *16 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2011) (“[S]chools with high teacher turnover can 
fall into a ‘vicious cycle’ in which the high turnover itself makes it more difficult to recruit and retain 
teachers, contributing to continued high turnover.”). 
276 RAUSCH & SKIBA, supra note 8, at 22. 
277 Id. (explaining that while “some portion of a school’s suspensions and expulsions are due to 
student misbehavior and anti-social attitudes,” the remainder is a product of “a complex and multi-
determined [administrative] process”). 
278 See, e.g., ANNE WHEELOCK, MASS. ADVOCACY CTR., THE WAY OUT: STUDENT EXCLUSION 
PRACTICES IN BOSTON MIDDLE SCHOOLS (1986); Mukuria, supra note 253, at 449 (finding that 
principal attitudes rather than student behavior played a significant factor in suspension rates); Dona M. 
Kagan, How Schools Alienate Students at Risk: A Model for Examining Proximal Classroom Variables, 
25 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 105, 107 (1990) (noting a study that found different discipline outcomes when 
students transferred to a new school); SKIBA ET AL., CONSISTENT REMOVAL, supra note 252, at 31–32 
(finding that school exclusion can lead to increased individual and community risk); see also Russell J. 
Skiba et al., Office Referrals and Suspension: Disciplinary Intervention in Middle Schools, 20 EDUC. & 
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN 295, 311 (1997) (finding that students are treated differently in different 
classes). 
279 Wu et al., supra note 253, at 255–56. 
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The key is to constructively engage students. Schools with low 
suspension rates use “prevention strategies to curtail inappropriate behavior 
(e.g., social skills training for students, behavior management training for 
teachers),” get parents involved “in the development of the school-wide 
discipline plan,” and believe “that responding to students’ needs and 
treating them with respect is effective in reducing problematic behavior.”280 
The general consensus of the research community is that positive 
behavioral supports, not punitive responses, are the most effective way to 
address student misbehavior.281 Likewise, misbehavior is often a coping 
mechanism for students struggling to overcome academic challenges, not a 
sign of bad behavior per se.282 The way to address an academic challenge is 
to provide academic support.283 Exclusion just makes matters worse.284 
The foregoing sophisticated analysis of school discipline and student 
achievement has the potential to entirely reframe the nature of discipline 
problems. It shows that student misbehavior is not just about students 
making bad choices or schools overreacting to those choices. Student 
misbehavior is contextual and depends on the quality of the social and 
academic environment. Likewise, students’ academic achievement is not 
just about how hard students study or how qualified their teachers are. 
Academic achievement is a function of the social and disciplinary 
environment in the school. Understood this way, states and schools have far 
more leverage to improve discipline and academic outcomes than one 
 
280 Mendez et al., supra note 154, at 273–74. 
281 Nance, supra note 14 (surveying and discussing the literature on positive behavioral supports 
and noting that the benefits have been verified in thousands of schools). 
282 VERN JONES & LOUISE JONES, COMPREHENSIVE CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT: CREATING 
COMMUNITIES OF SUPPORT AND SOLVING PROBLEMS (7th ed. 2004); João Lopes, Intervention with 
Students with Learning, Emotional, and Behavior Disorders: Why Do We Take So Long to Do It?, 
28 EDUC. & TREATMENT OF CHILDREN 345, 348–49 (2005); J. Ron Nelson et al., Academic 
Achievement of K-12 Students with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 71 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 
59, 67–68 (2004); Heather E. Sterling-Turner et al., Functional Assessment of Distracting and 
Disruptive Behaviors in the School Setting, 30 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 219–221 (2001) (discussing a 
case study of a child acting out to avoid difficult tasks). 
283 See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 337 (N.Y. 2003) (explaining that sound basic education 
“must still ‘be placed within reach of all students,’ including those who ‘present with socioeconomic 
deficits’”); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 389 n.16 (N.C. 2004) (discussing at-risk 
students whom the state was obligated to assist); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 179 
(S.C. 2014) (emphasizing the state’s duty to assist “school districts filled with students of the most 
disadvantaged socioeconomic background”). 
284 The students fall further behind and the chances of dropping out increase dramatically. ROBERT 
BALFANZ ET AL., SENT HOME AND PUT OFF-TRACK: THE ANTECEDENTS, DISPROPORTIONALITIES, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF BEING SUSPENDED IN THE NINTH GRADE (Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-
folder/state-reports/sent-home-and-put-off-track-the-antecedents-disproportionalities-and-
consequences-of-being-suspended-in-the-ninth-grade/balfanz-sent-home-ccrr-conf-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W5YE-S7GC]. 
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might otherwise assume. In fact, schools are and have been leveraging their 
power for some time. The problem is that they have too often used that 
leverage to suspend and expel students,285 which has undermined both the 
discipline climate and academic achievement. 
3. The Racial Achievement Gap as a Function of Discipline.—Harsh 
discipline policies potentially pose academic impediments for all students 
and schools. Schools, however, do not administer discipline evenly across 
demographic groups and schools. Most notably, African-Americans are 
suspended at anywhere from two to five times as often as white students, 
depending on the particular state and school.286 These higher suspension 
rates, combined with the differing disciplinary climate in predominantly 
minority schools, fuel the racial achievement gap. In 2015, for instance, the 
U.S. Department of Education reported that African-American’s math 
achievement lagged thirty-two points behind that of whites by the eighth 
grade on the National Assessment of Educational Progress—the equivalent 
of about three years’ worth of learning.287 
For decades, social science has attributed the racial achievement gap 
to poverty, segregation, and unequal access to resources.288 No doubt, these 
factors still influence the achievement gap. But recent studies reveal that a 
substantial portion of the achievement gap is attributable to problematic 
discipline policy and practices, which just so happen to be more prevalent 
 
285 See generally LOSEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (“If we ignore the discipline gap, we will be 
unable to close the achievement gap. Of the 3.5 million students who were suspended in 2011-12, 1.55 
million were suspended at least twice. Given that the average suspension is conservatively put at 3.5 
days, we estimate that U.S. public school children lost nearly 18 million days of instruction in just one 
school year because of exclusionary discipline.”). 
286 EDWARD J. SMITH & SHAUN R. HARPER, DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF K-12 SCHOOL 
SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION ON BLACK STUDENTS IN SOUTHERN STATES (2015), 
http://www.gse.upenn.edu/equity/sites/gse.upenn.edu.equity/files/publications/Smith_Harper_Report 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9RT-WGG7]. 
287 NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2016, at 152 fig.3 
(2016), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016144.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y9K-C828] (showing the gap); 
CHRISTOPHER LUBIENSKI & SARAH THEULE LUBIENSKI, NAT’L CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF 
PRIVATIZATION IN EDUC., CHARTER, PRIVATE, PUBLIC SCHOOLS. AND ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT: NEW 
EVIDENCE FROM NAEP MATHEMATICS DATA 5 (2006), http://epsl.asu.edu/epru/articles/EPRU-0601-
137-OWI.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RM3-BPG4] (explaining that ten scaled points on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress is roughly equivalent to one year of learning). 
288 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2009, at 153 
app.A, tbl.A-12-2, 157 tbl.A-13-2 (2009) http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009081.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2ZMZ-5BL5] (revealing achievement gaps between white and black students equivalent to nearly two 
years of learning); JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 21–22 (1966), http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED012275 [https://perma.cc/
WW99-LNL9] (attributing achievement gap to socioeconomic segregation); C. Kirabo Jackson et al., 
The Effect of School Finance Reforms on the Distribution of Spending, Academic Achievement and 
Adult Outcomes, Q.J. ECON (forthcoming 2016), www.nber.org/papers/w20118 [https://perma.cc/
FKP3-N53F] (attributing achievement gaps to resource inequalities). 
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in predominantly poor and minority schools.289 As a result, African-
Americans, on average, confront a disciplinary environment that depresses 
rather than improves student achievement. Based on these findings, the 
solution to harsh and counterproductive discipline may also be a solution, 
in part, to the racial achievement gap—two issues often considered 
separately.290 
Given the complexity of the analysis, the research on these points is 
relatively new and scarce. However, two major studies offer compelling 
findings.291 The first study reached the general finding that the percentage 
of low- or middle-income students in a school strongly correlates with the 
disciplinary climate and academic achievement in that school.292 Therefore, 
if the extent of segregation in school districts or communities increases, . . . 
there will be an increase in the variation of both disciplinary climate and 
academic achievement at the school level. In schools where advantaged 
students are concentrated, there will be fewer discipline problems and higher 
achievement levels, whereas schools serving disadvantaged students will have 
even worse discipline problems and lower levels of academic achievement.293 
The second study, by Richard Arum and Melissa Velez, confirmed 
this finding,294 but went much further in its analysis and conclusions. Arum 
and Velez attempted to quantify the extent to which the general racial 
achievement gap is attributable to discipline. Although an exact answer is 
 
289 See infra notes 291–311. 
290 See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 220, at 7–8 
(framing discipline issues in terms of school pushouts and juvenile justice involvement, not academic 
achievement); CTR. FOR EDUC. POLICY ANALYSIS, Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gaps, THE EDUC. 
OPPORTUNITY MONITORING PROJECT, http://cepa.stanford.edu/educational-opportunity-monitoring-
project/achievement-gaps/race/ [https://perma.cc/ZY2F-YNWB] (indicating much of the achievement 
gap is attributable to poverty factors, but listing several other nondiscipline-related education policies 
that may make matters worse—“the availability and quality of early childhood education, the quality of 
public schools, patterns of residential and school segregation, and state educational and social 
policies”). 
291 Another less sophisticated study preceded the two studies discussed above the line, but reached 
consistent results. In 1989, Valerie Lee and Anthony Bryk found that the average achievement gap 
between African-Americans and whites was smaller in Catholic schools than public schools, but the 
difference between the schools 
disappeared once we took into account the disciplinary climate of schools. The minority gap is 
largest in schools in which there is a high incidence of disciplinary problems. This finding 
suggests that the minority gap is smaller in the Catholic sector because the environments are more 
orderly and less disruptive. 
Lee & Bryk, supra note 249, at 185. 
292 Ma & Willms, supra note 273, at 185. 
293 Id. 
294 Arum & Velez, supra note 33, at 298 (“[S]chools with more than 50 percent of students from 
economically disadvantaged homes have significantly higher levels of principal reports of disciplinary 
disengagement.”). 
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elusive given the number of factors involved in the gap, they were able to 
link discipline and the racial achievement gap. 
They first replicated the longstanding research findings regarding the 
negative effects of attending a high-poverty school on student achievement, 
regardless of an individual student’s race or socioeconomic status, and the 
positive effects of attending a middle-income school.295 They also accepted 
the premise in that literature that differences in peer-to-peer learning, the 
ability to recruit high quality teachers, and other related factors drive the 
achievement gap between high- and low-poverty schools.296 But Arum and 
Velez found that there was a potentially even more important difference 
between schools: “a large and significant component of the negative effects 
of attending economically disadvantaged schools on test score performance 
is associated with the dysfunctional disciplinary climates that exist 
there.”297 
The average African-American student attends a school in which 59% 
of his peers are low income.298 Arum and Velez found that these 
predominantly poor schools are more likely to have dysfunctional 
discipline environments than other schools.299 This tendency of 
predominantly poor schools combined with the fact that African-Americans 
are consigned to them at a much higher rate than whites means that 
African-Americans are exposed to a very different disciplinary 
environment than whites.300 This differential exposure, according to Arum 
and Velez, largely explains the racial achievement gap. They found that 
nearly half of the achievement gap that researchers normally attribute to 
segregation is cancelled out when disciplinary measures are considered.301 
 
295 COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 288, at 21–22; RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: 
CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 47–76 (2001); Geoffrey D. 
Borman & Maritza Dowling, Schools and Inequality: A Multi-Level Analysis of Coleman’s Equality of 
Educational Opportunity Data, 112 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 1201, 1201–02 (2010). 
296 Arum & Velez, supra note 33, at 279–81. 
297 Id. at 302. 
298 GARY ORFIELD, REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A 21ST CENTURY 
CHALLENGE 14 (2009), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-
diversity/reviving-the-goal-of-an-integrated-society-a-21st-century-challenge/orfield-reviving-the-goal-
mlk-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TKF-YCDK]. 
299 Arum & Velez, supra note 33, at 295, 297–98 (finding that socioeconomically disadvantaged 
schools have classroom disruptions that are a standard deviation higher than other schools, and also 
have poorer climates and less disciplinary engagement by staff and administrators). 
300 Id. at 298. 
301 Arum & Velez, supra note 33, at 302 (finding that 45% of the variance in the achievement 
between African-Americans attending high- and low-poverty schools is attributable to the differences in 
the disciplinary environment in those schools). Some variance in achievement persisted even after 
accounting for differences in the disciplinary environment, but the study found the remaining variance 
was statistically insignificant. Id. at 317. 
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In a separate analysis, they also found that in more orderly environments, 
the racial achievement gap is “diminished to nearly zero” (after controlling 
for demographic factors).302 In sum, Arum and Velez’s study suggests 
decades of social science documenting the negative interaction between 
segregation and the academic achievement of African-Americans is 
explained by the fact that African-Americans generally experience 
disciplinary climates that depress academic achievement at much higher 
rates than whites.303 
Another recent study sought to quantify the academic effects of 
differential discipline within individual schools. In 2016, Edward Morris 
and Brea Perry published what they call “the first comprehensive study of 
the impact of suspension on racial differences in achievement.”304 They 
found that “school suspensions account for approximately one-fifth of 
black–white differences in school performance.”305 
This connection proceeds from three straightforward subsidiary 
factual findings. First, African-American students are far more likely to be 
suspended than other students. In the schools studied, African-Americans 
were “7.57 times as likely to be suspended as white students.”306 While this 
disparity could be partially explained by differences in socioeconomic 
status, eligibility for special education, and whether a student lived with a 
two-parent family, these factors could not cancel out the disparity. 
Accounting for all available factors, “black students are still estimated to be 
nearly two and a half times as likely to be suspended as white students.”307  
Second, “[s]tudents who have been suspended score substantially 
lower on end-of-year academic progress tests than those who have not, and 
even students with a propensity to be suspended perform worse in years 
where they are suspended relative to years when they are not.”308 Third, the 
negative effects of the initial suspension compound over time and set “into 
motion a trajectory of poor performance that continues in subsequent years, 
even if a student is not suspended again.”309 Over the course of two years, 
the average student who did not experience a suspension experienced a six-
point increase in achievement on end-of-year exams, while students who 
 
302 Id. at 317. 
303 Id. at 320. 
304 Edward W. Morris & Brea L. Perry, The Punishment Gap: School Suspension and Racial 
Disparities in Achievement, 63 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 68, 71 (2016). 
305 Id. at 68. 
306 Id. at 76. 
307 Id. at 77. 
308 Id. at 82. 
309 Id. 
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experienced a single suspension actually regressed by one point during that 
same period.310 The authors conclude that these findings demonstrate that 
the racially “unequal suspension rate is one of the most important factors 
hindering academic progress and maintaining the racial gap in 
achievement.”311 
In sum, the foregoing studies suggest that the academic impacts of 
discipline policies and practices are strong and that they explain a 
substantial amount of the achievement gap. Differences in the disciplinary 
environments between predominantly poor and predominantly middle-
income schools explain a substantial amount of the achievement gap 
between those schools. Moreover, even within individual schools, 
differential rates of suspension explain a substantial portion of the 
achievement gap between students, as the decision to suspend a student 
will widen whatever achievement gap may already exist between that 
student and others. 
B. Situating School Discipline Research Within  
School Finance Frameworks 
Social science connecting educational outcomes with discipline 
policies directly intersects with the state’s obligation to ensure that schools 
are delivering adequate and equal educational opportunities, particularly for 
disadvantaged students. A state’s obligations to provide schools with 
sufficient funding, teachers, curriculum, and facilities to ensure adequate 
educational opportunities is theoretically no different than an obligation to 
manage and implement effective discipline policies. The existence of a 
positive disciplinary environment, just like the presence of quality teachers, 
will determine whether many students achieve on grade level and graduate. 
Conversely, just like ineffective teaching, a lack of engaging curriculum, or 
dangerous facilities, a negative disciplinary environment will increase 
students’ chances of academic failure, suspension, and eventually dropping 
out of school. 
When schools combine negative disciplinary environments with high 
percentages of at-risk students, the results are often catastrophic. The gap 
between the academic outcomes in these schools and others is significant. 
Even for the well-behaved students, the chance of receiving a quality 
education and achieving academic success are low. While these 
 
310 Id. at 79–80. “Suspended students have lower baseline scores than never-suspended students, on 
average, possibly reflecting other unmeasured mechanisms of student success that are correlated with 
suspension,” but suspension widens this gap from “only a three-point deficit relative to those without a 
suspension” to a nine-point gap after two years. Id. 
311 Id. 
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achievement gaps have been central to past litigation, school discipline and 
the environmental climate have largely been ignored as causal factors. 
Until school quality litigation accounts for discipline, it will too often fall 
short of ensuring the quality and equal education opportunities it pursues. 
Unlike the theory in Part II, this claim does not depend on the 
existence of a constitutional right to education. Rather, this claim rests on 
the state’s duty to deliver adequate and equal educational opportunities. 
Where that duty exists, plaintiffs can challenge ineffective discipline policy 
by establishing four additional points. First, plaintiffs must show that the 
duty to deliver an adequate or equal education includes the duty to maintain 
effective discipline policies. Second, plaintiffs must show that ineffective 
disciplinary environments cause a substantial educational harm. Third, 
plaintiffs must show that the state, rather than students or some other 
factor, cause that harm. Fourth, plaintiffs may also need to demonstrate that 
strategies are available to reduce or eliminate the harm. These steps do not 
require plaintiffs to develop new doctrine, but simply to make an 
evidentiary case connecting discipline policies and data to school quality 
and student achievement. 
1. The Constitutional Duty Includes Discipline.—Plaintiffs in 
discipline cases, like those in school finance and quality cases, could base 
their claim on access to an adequate or equal education. Even without 
establishing an individual personal constitutional right to education, 
plaintiffs could base their claim on the state’s constitutional duty to deliver 
education. All state constitutions include this duty.312 The only variance 
among states is whether the state supreme court enforces that duty.313 So 
long as plaintiffs brought a claim in a state that exercised that authority, 
establishing an educational duty that the courts will enforce is not a barrier 
to pursuing a discipline claim. 
The question would then be whether discipline policy and practice fall 
within this duty. This question is both doctrinal and empirical. As to 
doctrine, Section II.B demonstrates adequacy and equity precedent is 
sufficiently broad to cover almost any education policy or practice that 
significantly affects educational outcomes. Courts have entertained 
adequacy and equity claims ranging from challenges to school district 
boundaries and segregation, teacher tenure, limited access to charter 
schools, low teacher salaries, school funding, and the absence of pre-
 
312 Thro, supra note 21. 
313 Weishart, supra note 184. In those states where courts do not enforce this duty, plaintiffs would 
presumably be unable to challenge discipline policy. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 
672 N.E.2d 1178, 1196 (Ill. 1996); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994). 
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kindergarten education.314 Discipline policy, insofar as it can entirely cut 
short the education of misbehaving students and determine the quality of 
the learning environment for other students, easily fits in the category of 
education policies that affect education outcomes.315 Thus, as a matter of 
doctrine, plaintiffs can raise it. 
The more difficult question is the empirical one of whether discipline 
policy causes education harms that are substantial and systemic enough to 
rise to a deprivation of an adequate or equal education.316 If so, a court 
might order an affirmative remedy by the state.317 If not, a court would 
likely find that the state has not breached its duty.318 The following Sections 
explore this empirical question and its subsidiary inquiries in detail. 
2. Establishing the General Causal Connection Between Discipline 
and Educational Opportunities.—The most challenging empirical 
showings in cases claiming that the state has failed to deliver equal or 
adequate educational opportunities all center around issues of causation. 
When plaintiffs challenge some particular deficiency in their education, 
they must establish that (1) the deficiency has a causal impact on 
educational opportunity; (2) that the impact is substantial enough to 
conclude that students have been denied an equal or adequate education; 
and (3) that the state, rather than some other factor, has caused or is in 
some way responsible for the deficiency. 
For instance, past cases have often alleged that students have been 
deprived of an adequate education because of the poor teaching quality in 
 
314 See supra notes 80–87. 
315 As Kevin Welner reasons, if the constitutional challenge to teacher tenure fits within existing 
precedent regarding the fundamental right to education, “[o]ther lawsuits might challenge laws and 
policies that result in inequities in class size, access to high-quality preschool, grade retention, 
exclusionary discipline, access to enriched and engaging curriculum, transportation, buildings and 
facilities, funding formulas, access to and use of technology, testing and accountability policies, and 
school choice policies.” Kevin G. Welner, Silver Linings Casebook: How Vergara’s Backers May Lose 
by Winning, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 121, 141 (2015). 
316 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (indicating “[a]n 
insubstantial burden” is insufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny); Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 
1287 (Conn. 1996) (requiring more than a “de minimus” injury); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 
790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky. 1989) (examining inequities throughout 177 local school districts); McDuffy 
v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 519–22 (Mass. 1993) (examining violations 
spanning across twelve districts). 
317 See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 745 (Ohio 1997) (directing the state to ensure an 
appropriate student–teacher ratio); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo.), as 
clarified on denial of reh’g, (Wyo. 1995) (directing the state to “achieve financial parity,” conduct a 
study of “a new funding system,” “describe what a ‘proper education’ is,” set “meaningful standards for 
course content and knowledge attainment,” and assess student progress). 
318 See, e.g., Vergara v. State, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (overturning trial court 
decision in favor of plaintiffs), as modified, 2016 WL 4443590 (Cal. Ct. App. May 3, 2016), reh’g 
denied, 2016 WL 4443590 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016). 
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their school or district.319 Those plaintiffs substantiated their case by 
showing that teacher quality correlates with student achievement, that 
teacher quality is one of the most important variables in student 
achievement, that uncertified and unqualified teachers are prevalent in 
schools with poor academic outcomes, and that the reason for these 
teaching inadequacies is the state’s funding policy.320 
Showings of this sort are typically made through a combination of 
social science studies, locally generated data, and statistical analysis. These 
studies and data rarely establish causation in any absolute sense, but they 
offer the circumstantial evidence upon which a court can infer causation.321 
This inference is most important on the general questions of whether an 
educational input or policy correlates with educational outcomes. Based on 
a strong correlation, a court can infer that an input, such as teacher quality, 
has a causal effect on achievement, graduation rates, or some other 
education outcome.322 Once a court makes this causal inference, the other 
factual and causal inquiries are more straightforward. If plaintiffs establish 
that teacher quality affects education outcomes as a general matter, it might 
be enough for plaintiffs to show that certain schools are exposed to high 
numbers of low-quality teachers, that achievement in those schools is low, 
and that some state policy prevents these schools from improving their 
teacher quality.323 
 
319 See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 
State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 261 (N.D. 1994); DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 744. 
320 See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 498–99 (Ark. 2002) (noting that 
“[w]ell-paid and well-motivated teachers are what make the education engine run,” but that they are not 
paid equally across the state); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 198 (“[T]here is great disparity in the poor and the 
more affluent school districts with regard to classroom teachers’ pay.”); CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 333 
(N.Y. 2003) (noting that teachers are the most important input for positive student outcomes). 
321 See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 340 (“The trial court reasoned that the necessary ‘causal link’ 
between the present funding system and the poor performance of City schools could be established by a 
showing that increased funding can provide better teachers, facilities and instrumentalities of 
learning. . . . We agree that this showing, together with evidence that such improved inputs yield better 
student performance, constituted plaintiffs’ prima facie case, which plaintiffs established.”). 
322 See, e.g., id. at 334 (“[W]e agree with the trial court’s holdings that teacher certification, test 
performance, experience and other factors measure quality of teaching; that quality of teaching 
correlates with student performance”); CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 1995) (equating a 
“correlation between funding and educational opportunity” with a “causal link”). 
323 See, e.g., Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 171 (S.C. 2014) (finding a 
deprivation of a minimally adequate education based on evidence that plaintiffs’ districts had higher 
rates of teachers who were on temporary contracts or had failed a certification test, without requiring 
evidence that those rates strongly correlated with lower student achievement), reh’g denied, (S.C. 
2015). It is also worth noting that some courts, while requiring causation, do not require sophisticated 
statistical analysis to establish it. Some courts accept the commonsense notion that certain key 
education resources such as teachers and textbooks affect the education students receive and, thus, state 
policies that create unequal or inadequate access to these resources deprive students of the 
constitutionally required education. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976); 
Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated sub nom., Askew v. Hargrave, 
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In discipline, this would likely entail demonstrating that suspension 
affects educational opportunities, those effects are substantial enough to 
deprive students of an equal or adequate education, and that the state, rather 
than students, are responsible for problematic discipline policies and high 
suspension rates. The first point—that suspension affects educational 
opportunities—is addressed in this Section, and the second and third points 
regarding the level of harm caused and the party responsible for it are 
addressed in the next two Sections. 
Broad-scale studies showing that negative climates and high 
suspension rates correlate with lower student achievement should be 
sufficient for a court to make the general causal inference that high 
suspension rates and disorderly environments affect educational 
opportunity. For instance, studies show that a single suspension can 
eliminate any educational progress a student would have made for the year 
and that when this effect is compounded across a school with a high 
suspension rate, the overall achievement of the entire student body— 
including suspended and nonsuspended students—is depressed.324 
Likewise, studies show that students in schools with better disciplinary 
environments tend to score better than they otherwise would if they were in 
schools with problematic disciplinary environments.325 These are the exact 
types of effects that have sufficed in cases challenging teacher quality, 
segregation, unequal funding, and other education policies.326 
Jason Nance’s recent synthesis of discipline studies also offers a 
qualitative explanation for the connection between discipline and the 
overall educational quality of a school. He explains:  
When teachers employ a varied-instructional approach that incorporates 
activities that target different learning styles and students’ needs; capture the 
students’ interests by making the material relevant to their lives; help students 
understand what is possible through cooperation and coordinated action with 
 
401 U.S. 476 (1971); see also Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be 
Learned, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1723, 1743–46 (2012) (discussing some courts’ simplistic approach to 
causation). 
324 See supra notes 248–75. 
325 See Rausch & Skiba, supra note 8 (surveying past literature on the academic consequences of 
discipline and reaching new empirical findings to the same effect). 
326 See, e.g., Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1287–88 (Conn. 1996) (finding that racial isolation 
is harmful to students and is a constitutional violation); Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 
22902963, at *49 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (“[T]he Court was persuaded, as a matter of fact, by the 
evidence that there is a causal connection between the poor performance of the vulnerable and/or 
protected categories of Kansas students and the low funding provided their schools.”); CFE II, 
801 N.E.2d at 334 (correlation between teaching quality and student performance sufficient evidence of 
deprivation of sound basic education). 
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others; and have supportive, caring environments with clear behavioral 
expectations, teachers experience far fewer behavioral problems.327  
In other words, schools that deliver a quality education generally do not 
have discipline problems, whereas those that deliver inadequate education 
do. 
In some respects, this explanation might blur the causal inquiry, 
raising the question of the extent to which high suspension rates cause poor 
academic outcomes versus the extent to which poor educational quality 
causes high suspension rates and poor outcomes. These factors likely have 
reciprocal effects on one another and this possibility need not undermine 
plaintiffs’ claim. To the contrary, it should strengthen them. First, as the 
strong connection between student achievement and discipline rates 
suggest, orderly and positive disciplinary environments are part of a quality 
education. In fact, this is the state’s very premise for excluding some 
students.328 Second, as a general matter, the state is responsible for both the 
quality of education it delivers and discipline policy outcomes.329 The state 
should not escape its duty in regard to both by confounding the distinctions 
between them. Finally, while education quality and suspensions surely 
interact, studies show that when holding all other things equal, the decision 
to police student behavior primarily through suspension correlates with 
lower academic outcomes.330 This alone should be sufficient for courts to 
infer the general causal connection between discipline and education 
outcomes. 
3. Demonstrating the Effects of Discipline Policies Rise to the Level 
of a Constitutional Harm.—The next step is to show the effect of 
discipline is substantial and systematic enough to independently or in 
conjunction with other policies deprive students of an adequate or equal 
education. As to an individual student who is expelled, the substantiality of 
the harm is obvious, but the systematic problem is not necessarily so. The 
issue for the broader claim that the state has failed to carry out its education 
 
327 Nance, supra note 14, at 347. 
328 See, e.g., Leonard v. Sch. Comm., 212 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Mass. 1965) (upholding exclusion of 
student based on his haircut because school believed it was necessary to protect order and classroom 
decorum); In re Jackson, 352 S.E.2d 449, 455 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (“A student’s right to an education 
may be constitutionally denied when outweighed by the school’s interest in protecting other students, 
teachers, and school property, and in preventing the disruption of the educational system.”). 
329 Precedent clearly establishes state responsibility for educational quality. See, e.g., Rose v. 
Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989); Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Pub. 
Sch. Fin. Sys.), 765 A.2d 673, 676 (N.H. 2000) (“The State may not shift any of this constitutional 
responsibility to local communities . . . .”). And as Section III.B.4 will establish, discipline outcomes 
are a result of the state’s actions and inactions. 
330 See supra notes 248–75. 
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duty is whether discipline policies systematically affect the delivery of 
education beyond individual students (or classrooms) and whether those 
systematic effects deprive students of an adequate or equal education. For 
instance, in the challenge to teacher tenure discussed in Section I.B.4, 
plaintiffs had alleged that teacher tenure caused grossly ineffective teachers 
to remain in the classroom, thereby depriving students of equal educational 
opportunities.331 Plaintiffs put forth general evidence to substantiate the 
causal connection between teacher quality and educational outcomes, as 
well as evidence that tenure presents barriers to the removal of teachers.332 
But the state appellate court rejected plaintiffs’ claim, reasoning that 
plaintiffs failed to show that tenure policies had systematically resulted in 
the retention of grossly ineffective teachers or that these teachers whom 
tenure protected were concentrated in particular schools.333 
Demonstrating a systematic problem in regard to school discipline 
should be simple. Evidence of substantial numbers of districts and/or 
schools with unusually high discipline rates is readily available in many 
states. While an acceptable or appropriate suspension rate is an elusive 
concept, the 2011–12 national suspension rate of 10%—which still is well 
above rates from the 1970s and 1980s—offers a reasonable if not 
conservative baseline for the purposes of this Article.334 In South Carolina, 
for instance, plaintiffs might point to the fact that one out of five schools 
have suspension rates that are double or more than double the national 
average.335 And about twenty schools have suspension rates so high—from 
50 to more than 100 percent—that relatively few students in those schools 
escape punishment over the course of the year.336 Analogous systematically 
high rates can be found in several other states.337 
 
331 Vergara v. State, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), as modified 2016 WL 4443590 
(Cal. Ct. App. May 3, 2016), reh’g denied, 2016 WL 4443590 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016). 
332 Id. at *5–6. 
333 Id. at *15–16. 
334 See LOSEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (identifying the national rate). Relying on the average 
suspension rate is also consistent with the findings that suspension rates below average are associated 
with modest increases in student achievement, but that suspension rates above the average are 
associated with substantial decreases in student achievement. Perry & Morris, supra note 11, at 1076. 
335 Search Student Expulsion and Suspension Data, School Year 2009–10, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 4, 
2013), http://www.edweek.org/ew/qc/2013/search-ocrdata.html [https://perma.cc/5F67-WRLV]. 
336 Id. 
337 In 2009, for instance, approximately one out of three school districts in Alabama had high 
school suspension rates of 20% or higher. Calculations based on Elementary and Secondary School 
Suspension Rates by State, Spreadsheet: Secondary Trends 2011–12, CTR. CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES, 
http://www.schooldisciplinedata.org/ccrr/resultsstate.php?us_state=AL&searchtype=raceonly&numStat
e=1 [https://perma.cc/75BD-4REK]. In North Carolina, one out of four districts fell in this category. Id.; 
see also LOSEN ET AL, supra note 2, at 23–24 tbl.7 (listing twenty-two states with statewide suspension 
rates in excess of 10% in secondary schools).  
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The more complicated question is whether the systematic use of 
suspension and its effects are substantial enough to amount to the 
difference between delivering an adequate and inadequate education. 
Because current social science studies are rarely framed in these 
constitutional terms, they do not explicitly answer the question. The 
studies’ findings, however, strongly suggest that schools with unusually 
high discipline rates deprive students of an adequate or equal education. 
For instance, Morris and Perry’s study showed that average students made 
significant academic progress over the course of two years, but that 
students suspended once actually regressed.338 Similarly, a West Virginia 
Department of Education study of its own data found that students “with 
one or more discipline referrals were 2.4 times more likely to score below 
proficiency in math than those with no discipline referrals; math 
proficiency among these students exhibited a 40 percentage point 
deficit.”339 Moreover, “[a]s the number of discipline referrals increased so 
did the odds of . . . scor[ing] below proficiency.”340 As a measure of 
whether students are receiving an adequate education, courts frequently ask 
whether substantial numbers of students are achieving below grade level.341 
For these students regressing rather than progressing, and at increased risk 
of scoring below proficient, the answer should easily be yes,342 and when 
the suspension rate rises to 20% or 30% in particular schools and districts 
across a state, this substantial harm occurs systematically. 
As emphasized in Part III, the harms of harsh discipline extend 
beyond just the suspended student. One study found that “[a]fter 
accounting for the influence of a school’s poverty rate, out-of-school 
suspension is the next strongest predictor of [a school’s overall] 
achievement. . . .”343 Other studies would suggest that the systematic effects 
of high suspension rates on students who do not misbehave is substantial. 
As Perry and Morris wrote, in schools with above average suspension rates, 
the “adverse effect of school suspension [on non-suspended students] 
 
338 Morris & Perry, supra note 236, at 79–81. 
339 ANDY WHISMAN & PATRICIA CAHAPE HAMMER, W. VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE ASSOCIATION 
BETWEEN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE: A CASE FOR POSITIVE DISCIPLINE 
APPROACHES, at v (2014), http://wvde.state.wv.us/research/reports2014/TheAssociationBetweenSchool
DisciplineandMathematicsPerformance2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNJ9-WWDG]. 
340 Id. 
341 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III), 693 A.2d 417, 427–29 (N.J. 1997) (discussing achievement on 
standardized state tests and its relevance to the constitutionality of the school system); CFE II, 
801 N.E.2d 326, 331 (N.Y. 2003); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d. 365, 382 (N.C. 2004). 
342 Moreover, Morris and Perry’s study showed that suspended students were already achieving at 
levels below other students prior to their suspension. Morris & Perry, supra note 236, at 79–81. Rather 
than assist these students in making academic progress, suspension compounds the problem. 
343 RAUSCH & SKIBA, supra note 8, at 20. 
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becomes especially pronounced. . . .”344 In schools with high suspension 
rates but otherwise low levels of violence, “the predicted percentile score in 
reading achievement decreases from about 54th at the mean level of 
suspension to 28th at very high levels of suspension. . . .”345 Likewise, 
Arum and Velez’s study emphasized that while a large achievement gap 
exists between high- and low-poverty schools, the gap is most pronounced 
between schools with orderly and disorderly disciplinary environments.346 
They further found that the achievement gap between high- and low-
poverty schools dissipates (after controlling for other factors) when the 
disciplinary environment is orderly. For the purposes of this Article, 
discipline’s effect on the achievement gap is crucial, as courts regularly cite 
statewide achievement gaps between minority students and whites, low-
income students and middle-income students, and high-poverty schools and 
low-poverty schools as evidence of a deprivation of an adequate and equal 
education.347 
In sum, statewide and school-level data on suspension rates combined 
with available social science can demonstrate that discipline policies have 
systemic and substantial effects on the delivery of an adequate and equal 
education. Substantial percentages of schools and districts suspend students 
well in excess of the national average. Once those suspension rates exceed 
the average, higher suspension rates correlate with lower academic 
achievement. That academic achievement is substantially lower for both 
the suspended and nonsuspended student and is of the sort courts have 
previously deemed as evidence of a constitutional harm. 
4. State Responsibility for Discipline.—In addition to showing that 
some policy or practice has a causal effect on educational outcomes, 
plaintiffs must show state responsibility for the policy or practice.348 For 
 
344 Perry & Morris, supra note 11, at 1077. 
345 Id. 
346 See, e.g., Arum & Velez, supra note 33. 
347 See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 488–89 (Ark. 2002) 
(stating that test scores are a “serious problem”); Montoy v. State, 2003 WL 22902963, at *47 (Kan. 
Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (“Kansas test results are informative and disturbingly telling.”); Rose v. Council 
for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky. 1989) (“[A]chievement test scores in the poorer 
districts are lower than those in the richer districts and expert opinion clearly established that there is a 
correlation between those scores and the wealth of the district.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 
(Claremont III), 794 A.2d 744, 752 (N.H. 2002); CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995); Leandro v. 
State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (N.C. 1997); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 
1995) (identifying assessments as an element of adequacy, but finding low test scores alone do not 
indicate inadequacy). But see James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2008) (questioning the heavy reliance on test scores). 
348 See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 335 (N.Y. 2003) (“[P]laintiffs had to show that insufficient 
funding led to inadequate inputs which led to unsatisfactory results.”); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 
599 S.E.2d 365, 386 (N.C. 2004) (“It is one thing for plaintiffs to demonstrate that a large number of 
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instance, a plaintiff might demonstrate that a school district has low-quality 
teaching and that the instruction depresses academic outcomes, but the 
reasons for low-quality teaching might be numerous.349 In many instances, 
the reasons are directly related to state level policy, such as insufficient 
state funding to recruit, retain, and train teachers.350 In other instances, the 
reasons may be related to poor local implementation, such as wasting state 
funds on ineffective programs. In other instances, the reasons could have 
little to do with state policy or local implementation, but could be the result 
of some other outside factor, such as a longstanding community 
controversy over religion, gender, race, or politics. The key here is to show 
that the state is the cause of the harms that students suffer, not some factor 
beyond the state’s control or responsibility. 
In the context of discipline, while disorderly environments and high 
suspension rates may have causal effects on educational quality, plaintiffs 
would also need to demonstrate that the state was the cause of these 
disciplinary problems (unless the claim is only against the local school 
district). This causal showing will generate fierce disputes between 
plaintiffs and the state. Almost as a matter of standard practice in school 
quality and finance cases, the state disputes the causal connection between 
its policies and the educational outcomes plaintiffs are challenging. First, 
states have sought to rebut the notion that state funding policy is causally 
connected to educational quality or outcomes.351 States argue that 
educational outcomes are more directly a product of student demographic 
variables and student effort.352 Second, states have argued that, to the extent 
money matters, the state has provided districts with sufficient funds and 
 
Hoke County students are failing to obtain a sound, basic public education. It is quite another for 
plaintiffs to show that such a failure is primarily the result of action and/or inaction of the State . . . .”). 
349 For a full discussion of the complex and various causes of low quality teaching, see Derek W. 
Black, Taking Teacher Quality Seriously, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2016). 
350 See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 334. 
351 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1973) (questioning 
whether “there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of 
education”); Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990) (recognizing dispute over whether and how 
money matters); see also Rebell, supra note 21, at 1484–85 (“[W]hether money matters in education 
was directly considered by the state courts in thirty [school funding cases]. In twenty-nine of them, the 
courts determined that money does indeed matter.”). 
352 Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1287 (Conn. 1996) (“[D]efendants stress . . . the significant 
role that adverse socioeconomic conditions play”); CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 341 (arguing against the idea 
that “children come to the New York City schools ineducable, unfit to learn”); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ., 
599 S.E.2d at 386 (“[T]he State contended that the evidence showed . . . [t]hat if a cognizable group of 
students within Hoke County are failing to obtain a sound basic education, it is due to factors other than 
the educational offerings provided by the State.”). 
111:1 (2016) Reforming School Discipline 
67 
that the problem is local mismanagement.353 For the most part, courts 
deciding these issues on the merits have rejected these arguments, but these 
issues are still contested today.354 
The debate surrounding discipline would be no less intense, but the 
causal analysis potentially cleaner. The connection between disciplinary 
environments and educational outcomes is arguably stronger than the 
connection between money and education outcomes. With money, much 
depends on local variables and on how districts spend that money; thus, the 
connection between money and educational outcomes is far from 
absolute.355 But discipline policy appears to have a more direct effect on 
educational outcomes than money.356 With that said, creating a positive 
disciplinary environment and effectively reducing suspensions calls for a 
more complex remedy than just an increase in state funding. 
This last point would offer the state a second opening to challenge its 
causal responsibility. In particular, the state might claim that students 
and/or misguided teachers, administrators, and school boards are the cause 
of misbehavior and negative environments. Shifting blame to students has 
obvious appeal. As noted in Section II.B, some courts already instinctively 
blame students and reason that suspensions and expulsions do not warrant 
heightened scrutiny because misbehaving students forfeit their education 
rights.357 In the context of a school quality or equality claim, however, 
shifting blame to students is more difficult because the claim would be 
brought on behalf of not only misbehaving students, but innocent 
bystanders. On this basis, both the logic and rhetorical value of shifting 
blame onto students would disappear. Studies also indicate the state is 
simply wrong on the facts. While student misbehavior is a product of 
individual choice, it is heavily influenced by context.358 Schools that foster 
 
353 Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting argument that state 
caused “no more than 10 to 30 percent” of disparities); CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 343 (arguing that 
“inefficient management of personnel is the supervening cause . . . rather than the funding system”). 
354 Rebell, supra note 21, at 1486 (“Only one court has clearly held that money does not matter.”). 
355 See generally Black, supra note 323, at 1762–63 (discussing the variables in school funding and 
how they complicate causal questions). 
356 Compare BRUCE D. BAKER, ALBERT SHANKER INST., REVISITING THAT AGE-OLD QUESTION: 
DOES MONEY MATTER IN EDUCATION? 6 (2012), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED528632.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RT2-CBU9] (finding in new studies “a positive, statistically significant (though at 
times small) relationship between student achievement gains and financial inputs”), with Perry & 
Morris, supra note 11, at 1077 (indicating the effect of discipline on student achievement is “especially 
pronounced”). 
357 Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1096 (Mass. 1995); Kolesnick ex rel. Shaw v. 
Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Neb. 1997); In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 874 (Wyo. 2004) 
(“[S]tudent can[] temporarily forfeit educational services through his own conduct.”). 
358 See, e.g., RAUSCH & SKIBA, supra note 8, at 22; Wu et al., supra note 253. 
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negative policies and climates, in effect, cause a certain percentage of 
additional misbehavior and a certain percentage of lower achievement.359 
So long as a court accepted the evidence that school climate influences 
behavior and academics, plaintiffs should be able to establish the causal 
connection between state policy, school discipline, and educational 
outcomes. 
A state’s claim that local school actors are to blame should be even 
easier to reject. As prior courts have emphasized, the duty to ensure an 
adequate or equal education ultimately rests on the state.360 If problematic 
decisions or circumstances are occurring locally, the state has a 
responsibility to identify and correct them.361 The discipline problem in 
many districts does not stem from bad actors per se. It often results from a 
lack of capacity to deal constructively with and understand the causes of 
misbehavior.362 In this respect, local discipline policies are directly tied to 
the support the state provides—or fails to provide. 
Insofar as school climate and discipline are central to educational 
outcomes, they are part of the educational program the state must support 
and fund, just as it would teacher training and certification programs and 
requirements. With discipline, however, many states have incentivized and 
mandated harsh responses to discipline rather than supporting more 
constructive approaches. For instance, in South Carolina, state statutes 
authorize schools to suspend or expel students for the violation of any 
school board rule,363 with no suggestion that better alternatives are 
available. Likewise, in Mississippi, a state statute authorizes districts to 
expel students after three instances of “disruptive behavior.”364 Those states 
that do not mandate or directly incentivize harsh discipline responses 
delegate so much discretion to local districts that nothing restrains those 
districts from making bad decisions. 
 
359 See, e.g., ARUM, supra note 241, at 182 (finding students more willing to defy authority in 
overly harsh discipline regimes); Ma & Willms, supra note 273, at 170 (finding student behavior varied 
based on school characteristics). 
360 Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989) (“[T]he sole 
responsibility for providing the system of common schools lies with the General Assembly.”); CFE II, 
801 N.E.2d 326, 344 (N.Y. 2003) (“[T]he State has ultimate responsibility for the schools . . . .”); Hoke 
Cty. Bd of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 389 (N.C. 2004) (holding state ultimately responsible for the 
education local school boards provide). 
361 Supra note 360. 
362 IRA GLASS, 538: IS THIS WORKING? (Oct. 17, 2014) (transcript), 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/538/transcript [https://perma.cc/9ABN-BR8H] 
(revealing through discussions with teachers that many of them are just winging it). 
363 S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-210(A) (2013) (authorizing expulsion for the violation of any school 
board rule). 
364 MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-18.1 (2014) (authorizing expulsion for disruptive students). 
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Either way, responsibility for high levels of suspension and expulsion 
falls on the state. On the one hand, the state actively promotes problematic 
discipline environments with statutes of the sort described above. On the 
other, it ignores the importance of maintaining a positive and supportive 
disciplinary environment and leaves its agents—school districts and 
administrators—to fend for themselves. In both instances, the state is 
creating the conditions for negative discipline environments to occur. Thus, 
the response to a state’s attempt to cast blame on districts would be simple: 
the state is both vicariously and directly responsible for negative climates 
that persist in school districts.365 
5. Viable Remedies.—Courts may require plaintiffs to demonstrate 
the state can actually fix the identified problems. Here, many of the issues 
that came up with causation can resurface. For instance, even if the state is 
responsible for the conditions that incentivize bad behavior, what, if any, 
tools does the state have to actually improve school climates and reduce 
student misbehavior? The short answer is that while the state cannot stop 
misbehavior altogether, research shows that it has tools to minimize it. 
The research on alternatives to school exclusion consistently shows 
that states can improve climates and reduce misbehavior. First, as Jason 
Nance writes in his review of the literature, “[p]erhaps the most important 
initiative that lawmakers can support and educators can implement . . . [to 
avoid] extreme disciplinary measures is to improve the strength and quality 
of classroom activities and the classroom management skills of teachers.”366 
This remedial step, again, points back to the fundamental connection 
between educational quality and discipline outcomes. 
Second, states can adopt discipline programs that are explicitly non-
punitive. States can do this through one of two major categorical 
approaches: restorative justice, or positive behavioral supports and 
interventions. Restorative justice is premised on the notion that when a 
student misbehaves, the student harms others in the school community. 
Rather than punish the student, restorative justice asks that the student 
communicate with those he or she has harmed and identify ways to repair 
the harm and resolve any conflict. Studies have shown that these programs 
 
365 This is not to say that states have uniformly ignored the problem. Some have taken important 
first steps in the direction this Article proposes. See, e.g., MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., RESTORATIVE 
PRACTICES, http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/dse/safe/clim/prac/ [https://perma.cc/RRH2-C6U4]. 
Regardless of whether these steps are sufficient to resolve the discipline problem in a particular state, 
the fact that some have demonstrates the ability of other states to do the same. 
366 Nance, supra note 14, at 346. 
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can dramatically reduce the incidence of interpersonal conflicts in schools 
and improve the overall environment as a result.367  
Positive behavioral intervention and support programs “aim[] to alter 
the school environment by creating improved systems (e.g., discipline, 
reinforcement, data management) and procedures (e.g., office referral, 
training, leadership) that promote positive change in staff behaviors, which 
subsequently alter[s] student behaviors.”368 More particularly, school 
personnel are trained on how to develop constructive behavior 
interventions, promote positive learning environments, reward appropriate 
student behavior, and apply these rewards and interventions consistently 
across time.369 Studies show that positive behavioral support systems can 
improve student behavior and achievement.370 This approach has proven so 
effective that the U.S. Department of Education has created a technical 
assistance center to help schools implement the program and has endorsed 
it as a remedy in schools with disproportionately high suspension and 
expulsion rates for minority students.371 
To be clear, a number of schools have already adopted these 
programs, and some states have established programs to assist these 
districts.372 But the state must do much more than offer technical assistance 
and wait on districts to voluntarily adopt these programs. States must 
actively fund and require transitions to new disciplinary environments in 
those schools where discipline is impeding the delivery of equal and 
adequate educational opportunities. Moreover, state involvement is 
 
367 See, e.g., MARILYN ARMOUR, ED WHITE MIDDLE SCHOOL RESTORATIVE DISCIPLINE 
EVALUATION: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 23–30, https://irjrd.org/files/2016/01/Ed-White-
Evaluation-2012-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4DB-GF3S]; MYRIAM L. BAKER, DPS RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE PROJECT: YEAR THREE 9–17 (2009); INT’L INST. FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICES, IMPROVING 
SCHOOL CLIMATE: FINDINGS FROM SCHOOLS IMPLEMENTING RESTORATIVE PRACTICES 6 (2009) 
http://www.iirp.edu/pdf/IIRP-Improving-School-Climate-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KP2-F496]; L.A. 
UNIFIED SCH. DIST., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN ACTION (Oct. 28, 2014), 
https://boe.lausd.net/sites/default/files/10-28-14SSCRestorativeJusticeInAction.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G9RX-YTHG]; see also Patricia Leigh Brown, Opening Up, Students Transform a Vicious Circle, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/education/restorative-justice-programs-
take-root-in-schools.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/G57F-SZPZ]. 
368 Bradshaw et al., supra note 154, at 134. 
369 Nance, supra note 14, at 357–59. 
370 See, e.g., Bradshaw et al., supra note 154, at 139–40; Douglas A. Cheney et al., A 2-Year 
Outcome Study of the Check, Connect, and Expect Intervention for Students at Risk for Severe Behavior 
Problems, 17 J. OF EMOTIONAL AND BEHAV. DISORDERS 226, 226–43 (2009); Robert Horner et al., A 
Randomized Control Trial of School-Wide Positive Behavior Support in Elementary Schools. 11 J. 
POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 133, 133–44 (2009). 
371 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS, Technical Assistance Center on 
Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports, https://www.pbis.org/ [https://perma.cc/T8ZW-5P8N]; 
Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 19. 
372 See, e.g., Bradshaw et al., supra note 154, at 134 (indicating that 9000 districts had adopted 
positive behavioral supports). 
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necessary to ensure that the programs are implemented properly. Research 
has shown that to be effective, the programs must be implemented carefully 
over an extended period of time.373 
Whether a court would specifically require any particular program is 
uncertain. After deciding the first four elements in plaintiffs’ claim (duty, 
harm, causation, responsibility), courts might direct the state, within its 
discretion, to enact a reasonable remedy.374 Only if the state refuses to 
implement a reasonable remedy will courts be more proscriptive.375 
Regardless, the state would have a relatively clear set of remedial options: 
ensuring funding for local school districts to develop and implement their 
own discipline improvement plans; officially endorsing some non-punitive 
approach to discipline, such as positive behavioral supports; monitoring 
discipline data to identify problematic districts and schools and specifically 
targeting remedies there; and/or changing the statutory structure for school 
discipline to reduce reliance on suspension and expulsion. 
C. Pros and Cons of a Systemic Duty-Based Approach to Discipline 
Versus an Individual Rights Approach 
While the two legal theories for reforming school discipline theories 
are not mutually exclusive, they are very different in form and evidence. 
The theory that the deprivation of education through suspension triggers 
heightened scrutiny is more individual in nature, whereas the theory that 
problematic disciplinary environments interfere with quality education is 
group-based. As such, they would involve very different types of evidence 
and legal framing. There are advantages to each. 
The advantage of the individual right to education is its relative 
simplicity. First, as described in Part II, the questions to be answered are all 
doctrinal. The cases could potentially proceed on the briefs without even 
resorting to evidentiary trials.376 Second, the answers to the doctrinal 
 
373 Bradshaw et al., supra note 154 (comparing fully implemented and trained programs to others); 
Nance, supra note 14, at 355–56 (emphasizing that restorative justice involves cultural change that does 
not happen quickly and requires sustained effort over three to five years). 
374 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989) (“The General 
Assembly must provide adequate funding for the system. How they do this is their decision.”); Hoke 
Cty. Bd of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 395 (N.C. 2004) (“[P]roviding specific remedies for 
violations [of the right to education] . . . is within [the executive and legislative branch’s] primary 
domain.”). 
375 Abbott IV, 710 A.2d 450, 458–61 (N.J. 1998); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 
(Wyo. 1995). 
376 In the few cases litigated thus far, the facts have involved only one or two students, been 
uncontested, and barely even warranted discussion in the courts’ final opinions. In fact, the courts’ 
description of the misbehavior was vague at best in several cases. See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of 
Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1090 (Mass. 1995) (indicating the student had a blade in lipstick case); King ex 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
72 
questions would, of course, be contested, but if a court recognized an 
individual right to education, heightened scrutiny would follow and 
plaintiffs’ claims would almost automatically fall into place, as the burden 
would shift to the state. Third, the remedies would, likewise, be simple and 
immediate. Insofar as suspension and expulsion were overly broad 
responses under certain circumstances, a court could simply prohibit them 
or hold that schools must specifically justify them. In short, this individual 
claim offers the potential of quick, concrete victories. 
The individual claim’s weaknesses, however, are the systemic claim’s 
strengths. While victory in individual claims might trigger broader 
substantive reforms, the remedies could just as easily be limited and 
potentially make matters worse. Schools could just stop suspending 
students without making any other changes,377 which could make schools 
more dysfunctional.378 If the underlying environment remains problematic, 
students will continue to misbehave and their numbers will increase. 
School officials, moreover, would blame courts for saddling them with 
problem students that the officials believe should be suspended or 
expelled.379 In short, strict scrutiny could lead to blunt remedies that fail to 
address the fundamental challenges in school discipline. 
In contrast, a school quality claim would focus exclusively on the 
fundamental problems in school discipline and force substantive reform of 
schools’ disciplinary environment. This type of reform may be more 
palatable to both courts and schools. Because the focus is on improving 
school quality, not simply prohibiting suspensions, teachers and schools are 
more likely to favorably perceive it.380 Courts’ perceptions are also likely 
different because, unlike the individual right claim, it would not pit 
misbehaving students against others. It would also moot the forfeiture 
theory. In this context, courts would be asked to ensure quality education, 
not block the punishment of misbehaving students. 
Finally, ensuring quality or equal education would not require courts 
to answer new doctrinal issues. Courts would only need to incorporate the 
 
rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 261 (N.C. 2010) (only indicating a 
fight involving multiple students occurred). 
377 This was the explicit concern in King. 
378 King, 704 S.E.2d at 264 (speculating that applying strict scrutiny would jeopardize the safety of 
schools). 
379 According to Arum, see supra note 241, this was the response to Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 
(1975). 
380 See Kevin McCorry, Philly District Orders School Police to Stay Out of Level 1 Offenses, 
NEWSWORKS (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/education/66215-philly-
district-orders-school-police-to-stay-out-of-level-1-offenses [https://perma.cc/W6TX-3ZTF] (discussing 
teachers’ negative response to basic prohibitions on referrals to law enforcement in Philadelphia 
because new policy did not address other underlying problems). 
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empirical evidence into existing doctrinal frameworks. This empirical 
evidence would also more clearly signal a positive end result, whereas the 
individual claim potentially asks courts to break new doctrinal ground and 
strike down practices with no assurance that what replaces them will 
improve education. In sum, the educational quality claim would make the 
most impact. The only significant drawback is that the litigation itself 
would be far more time- and resource-intensive, involving extensive social 
science evidence, state-wide analysis of discipline outcomes, connecting 
discipline data to academic outcomes, and establishing that this empirical 
evidence is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past few decades, precedent developed in school funding and 
quality litigation has generated nothing less than a rights revolution in state 
constitutional law. That rights revolution, however, has had almost no 
impact on the current crisis in school discipline. This disconnect is striking. 
In states where education is a constitutional or fundamental right, one 
would expect schools to be far more careful in suspending and expelling 
students. Likewise, empirical evidence increasingly demonstrates that 
school discipline policy and educational quality are inextricably linked. 
Yet, both courts and policymakers treat them as separate issues. 
In their defense, momentous precedential changes can take years to 
absorb. School finance litigation went through its own developmental 
phase from the early 1970s into the 1990s. In some states, it is still 
developing. Discipline litigation has yet to experience this development 
and scholars have done very little to theorize it. 
A constitutional right to education and the duties it imposes on the 
state should completely reframe how courts look at discipline. But the 
absence of school finance opinions explicitly linking education rights and 
quality to discipline has slowed this recognition. The path forward is 
twofold. First, courts must directly answer the question of whether the 
general constitutional duties and rights developed in school finance 
litigation also create an individual interest in education that, when taken 
away, triggers heightened scrutiny. All signals and logic indicate the 
answer should be yes. Second, litigants and courts must move beyond an 
individualized concept of discipline and focus on how discipline policy and 
practice interfere with the state’s duty to deliver adequate and equal 
educational opportunities. The very quality of education students receive in 
a school will be largely a function of the disciplinary environment in the 
school. The disciplinary environment in many of the lowest achieving 
schools is also the most dysfunctional. In these schools, discipline 
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reform—not just academic reform—is a necessary intervention to ensure 
adequate and equal educational opportunities. 
 
